RETROSPECTIVE AND EX POST FACTO LAWS.

or the number of stripes diminished in cases punishable in that
manner. Anything which, if applied to an individual sentence,
would fairly fall within the idea of a remission of a part of the
sentence, would not be liable to objection. And any change which
should be referable to prison discipline, or penal administration, as
its primary object, might also be made to take effect upon past as
well as future offences, as changes in the manner or kind of employment of convicts sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision,
the means of restraint or the like. Changes of this sort might
operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the punishment of
the convict, but would not raise any question under the constitutional provision we are considering."
H. CAMPBELL BLACK.
Williamsport, Pa.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Mlassachusetts.
TRAINER v. TRUAIBULL.
A., an infant, had a father and mother living, but who did nothing for his support; he himself being in an almshouse, and in a sickly condition. B. was told by
the father of A. that A. would at his (the father's) death, be worth $10,000, and
was requested by the father to care for A. ; and B., after satisfying herself of the
truth of the statements made by the father, and relying solely upon the credit of tie
estate which was to be A.'s at the death of his father, removed A. from the almshouse, and undertook and continued the maintenance of A. for a number of years.
Held, that the Superior Court was justified in finding, on the facts, that the food,
clothing, &c., furnished A., were necessaries for which he should be held responsible,
notwithstanding that he, being a pauper and an inmate of an almshouse, was supplied with necessaries there.
Although a guardian is not obliged to provide for the support of his ward when
he has no property of the ward available for that purpose, and although he may,
under such circumstances, place the ward in an almshouse, this by no means implies
that a boy, with an expectation of a fortune of $10,0o0, should be brought up in an
almsbouse, if any suitable person will take him, and bring him up properly, on the
credit of his expectations ; and the support and education furnished to an infant of
such expectations, whose means were not presently available, fall clearly within the
class of necessaries.

Tnis was an action of contract for articles furnished to the defendant, a minor, by the plaintiff. Hearing in the Superior Court,
before BRIGHAM, .J., without a jury, who found the following
facts: Defendant was a minor, who was born in January 1868, and
was the only child of George B. Trumbull, who died at the Soldier's
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Home in Togus, Maine, November 1st 1882, where he had resided
from 1876 and previously. Defendant's mother, who was the wife
of said George B. Trumbull, was, on October 25th 1875, committed
to the house of industry on Deer Island, Boston, and defendant
was, on the same day, sent to the almshouse on said Deer Island as
a pauper, and there remained until he was removed to the Marcella
street home for paupers and neglected boys and girls, in April 1877.
On November 17th 1877, the plaintiff removed defendant from
said Marcella street home to her home, he then being a pauper, and
in a diseased and sickly condition, and there kept him to the time
of bringing this action, and during all this period maintained defendant, providing him with food, clothing, lodging, medical attendance, and nursing when sick, and the means of education, at a cost
to plaintiff, which, in addition to the reasonable value of her services in making such provision,-which the court ruled, as a matter
of law, was a provision for necessaries to defendant,-was not less
than the sum stated in the account annexed to the declaration.
Plaintiff, on a visit to Togus, and to the Soldiers' Home, in 1876,
became acquainted with said George B. Trumbull, who exhibited
much distress on account of defendant being an inmate of an asylum
for paupers, and his reported sickly condition; stating to her that
he, George B. Trumbull, had certain property bequeathed to him
by one Susan Bryant, whose adopted son he was, which gave him
only a small income, but that at his death the defendant would be
worth $10,000. Plaintiff, at said George B. Trumbull's request,
having informed herself of the provisions of the will of Susan Bryant, and of the terms of a lease to one Cutler, made by George B.
Trumbull, of the property received from said Susan Bryant, and of
the value and income of the estate to which it related, andertook
and continued the maintenance of defendant as aforesaid, not in any
respect relying upon the credit of George B. Trumbull, but relying
solely upon the credit of defendant's estate. One Teele, since November 1883, as guardian of the defendant, has had possession and
control of real estate in Boston of the value of about $8000, which
constitutes all of defendant's property. At the close of plaintiff's
case defendant offered no evidence, hut requested the court to rule,
as matter of law, that upon all the facts in evidence on the part of
the plaintiff this action could nbt be maintained. The court refused
to rule as requested, and ruled that upon the facts found the plaintiff was entitled to the sum stated in her account, found for the
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plaintiff, assessed damages in the sum of $1112.53, and ordered
judgment for plaintiff for that sum; and the defendant alleged
exceptions.
Brown J-Keyes, for defendant.
J. R?. Smith, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
0. ALLEN, J.-The practical question in this case is whether the
food, clothing, &c., furnished to the defendant were necessaries for
which he should be held responsible. This question must be determined by the actual state of the case, and not by appearances; that
is to say, an infant who is already well provided for in respect to
board, clothing, and other articles suitable for his condition, is not
to be held responsible if any one supplies to him other board, clothing, &c., although such person did not know that the infant was
already well supplied: Angel v. XcLellan, 16 Mass. 31; Swift v.
Bennett, 10 Cush. 436; Davis v. Caldwell, 12 Id. 512; Barnes
v. Toye, 13 Q. B. Div. 410. So, on the other hand, the mere fact
that an infant, as in this case, had a father, mother and guardian,
no one of whom did anything towards his care or support, does not
prevent his being bound to pay for that which itas actually necessary for him when furnished. The question whether or not the
infant made an express promise to pay is not important. He is held
on a promise implied by law, and not, strictly speaking, on his
actual promise. The law implies the promise to pay from the necessity of his situation; just as in the case of a lunatic: I Chit. Cont.
197 ; -Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones (N. 0.) 111; Richardson v. Strong,
13 Ired. 106; Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. 403; Epperson v. Nugent,
57 Miss. 45-47. In other words, he is liable to pay only what the
necessaries were reasonably worth, and not what he may improvidently have agreed to pay for them. If he has made an express promise to pay, or has given a note in payment, for necessaries, the
real value will be inquired into, and he will be held only for that
amount: Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. 387; Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H,
346; Mete. Cont. 73, 75.
But it is contended that the board, clothing, &c., furnished to
the defendant were not necessaries, because he, "being a pauper,
and an inmate of an almshouse, was supplied with necessaries, suitable to his estate and condition, and, under the circumstances, it
VoL. XXXV.-88
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would have been the duty of the guardian to place him in the almshouse." It is true that a guardian is not obliged to provide for the
support of his ward when he has no property of the ward available
for that purpose; and, if he has no other resource, no doubt he may,
under such circumstances, place the ward in an almshouse. The
authorities cited for the defendant go no further than this : 'S ning
v. Woodworth, 2 Allen 206. But this by no means implies that a
boy with expectation of a fortune of $10,000 should be brought up
in an almshouse if any suitable person will take him, and bring him
up properly, on the credit of his expectations. On the other hand,
it seems to us highly proper for a parent or guardian, under such
circumstances, to do what the father did in this case; leaving it for
the boy's guardian to see to it that an unreasonable price is not paid.
Looking to the advantage of his subsequent life, as well as to his
welfare for the time being, his transfer from an almshouse to a
suitable person, by whom he would be cared for and educated, would
certainly be judicious; and the support and education furnished to
an infant of such expectations, whose means were not presently
available, fall clearly within the class of necessaries. In Metc. Cont.
70, the authority of Lord MANSFIELD is cited to the point that a
sum advanced for taking an infant out of jail is for necessaries:
Earl of BuckingLamshire v. -Drury,2 Eden 72. See, also, Clarke
v. Leslie, 5 Esp. 28. Giving credit to the infant's expectation of
property is the same as giving credit to him.
There was no error in refusing to rule, as matter of law, that
upon all the facts in evidence the action could not be maintained.
The findings of all matters of fact, of course, are not open to revision. Exceptions overruled.
Since the case of Bainbridgev. Pickering, 2 W. Black. 1325, it has never,
so far as we know, been questioned, but
that an infant who lives with and is properly maintained by his parent or guardian, cannot bind himself to a stranger
for necessaries: see Gay v. Ballou, 4
Wend. 403; Bivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich.
Eq. 274 ; Kraker v. Byrun, 13 Rich. L.
163 ; Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2 Paige 419;
Wailing v. Toll, 9 Johns. 141 ; Guthrie
v. Murphy, 4 Watts 80; Angel v. 3"cLellan, 16 Mass. 31; Pool v. Pratt, I
Chip. 253 ; Beelerv. Young, 1 Bibb 521 ;
Connolly v. Hull, 3 HeCord 6; Cook v.

Deaton, 3 C. & P. 114; McKanna v.
Merry, 61 1l. 180; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga. 475 ; Elrod v. Myers, 2
Head 33 ; Perrinv. Wlson, 10 Mo. 451;
Davis v. Caldwell, 12 Cush. 513 ; Brooker v. Shott, 11 M. & W. 67 ; Burghart
v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690; Steedman
v. Rose, I C.& M. 422 ; tory v.Pery,
4 C & P. 526.
The term necessaries is a relative one
and includes such things as are useful
and suitable to the state and condition in
life of the party and not merely such as
are required for bare subsistence; and it
is a question for the jury whether thE
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articles furnished are such as a reasonable
person of the age and station of the infant would require for real use : Peters
v. Ileming, 6 M. & W. 42. In this case
the action was brought to recover a bill
for several rings, a watch-chain, pins,
&c., amounting to 81. Os. 6d., from the
defendant, who was the eldest son of a
gentleman of fortune and a member of
parliament, and who at the time when
the goods were furnished was an undergraduate of the University of Cambridge;
and the jury, to whom the question
whether the articles were necessary or
not, found that they were necessary, and
this finding was affirmed by the court.
The articles for which an infant is
sought to be charged must not only come
within the general class of necessaries in
law, but must also be in fact necessary to
the infant under the particular circumstances in which he is placed : Reeves's
Dom. Eel. *227. Thus, an over-supply
of the infant's wants, though the articles
may in other respects be regarded as necessaries, gives a demand against him
only for so much as was actually needed:
Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. 80.
Where the minor resides with his parents, it will, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be presumed that he is properly supplied with necessaries: Connolly
v. Hull, 3 M Cord 6 ; Jones v. Colvin, 1
Mclull. 14 ; Perrin v. Wfilson, 10 Mo.
451 ; Freeman v. Bridger, 4 Jones L. 4.
Infancy being shown, the burden of
proof is with the plaintiff to show that
the articles sued for were necessary for
the infant: Thirallv. Wright, 38 Vt. 494;
Nicholson v. lVilborn, 13 Ga. 475 ; and
so whether in the class of necessaries or
not: Thrall v. Wright, supra.
Whether the articles are of those classes
for which an infant is bound to pay, is
matter of law to be judged of by the
court ; and this question is first to be
settled : Beeler v. Yning, 1 Bibb 521 ;
Glover v. Ott, I McCord 572 ; Bent v.
Manning, 10 Vt. 230 ; Tupper v. Cudwell, 12 Met. 563; Grace v. Hale, 2
Humph. 29; Stanton v. Villson, 3 Day

57 ; Maddox v. filler, 1 M. & S. 738;
McKanna v. M3erry, 61 Il1. 178; .Tordan
v. Coffield, 7 W. N. C. 116; Merriam
v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40.
But this preliminary question being
determined, " if they fall under those
general descriptions, then whether they
were actually necessary and suitable to
the condition and estate of the infant,
and of reasonable price, must regularly
be left to the jury as matter of fact:"
Bing. on Inf. 86, note (1), 87 ; Story
on Sales,
35 ; Beeler v. Young, I Bibb
521 ; Bent v. Manning, 10 Vt. 230 ;
Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph. 29 ; McKanna
v. Merry, 61 Ill. 178; Jordan v. Coffield, 7 W. N. C. 110 ; Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Harrisonv. Fane,
1 3,. & G. 550 ; Stanton v. Wilson, 3
3 Day 57; Maddox v. Miller, 1 M. &
S. 738 ; Ryder v. Wiombwell, L. R., 3
Exch. 90; s. c. 4 Id. 32. The case of
Ryder v. Wombwell, may well be read in
this connection. It contains an interesting and instructive discussion of the general question of the nature of necessaries.
There can be no question but that
the food, clothing, &c., furnished the
defendant in the principal case, come
within the legal class of necessaries.
It would seem to be equally clear that
they were actually necessary to the infant
in his then situation. While doubtless
an infant will not be liable for necessaries furnished him, merely because his
father is poor and unable himself to pay
for them (Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397),
the credit in this ease having been given
to the defendant, and the board, clothing,
&c., having transferred the defendant
from the condition of a pauper to the care
of a suitable person, under whose care be
had an opportunity to become a useful
member of society, to hold that this was
not in fact in the highest degree necessary would be contrary to common sense
and a disgrace to the law. Upon the
whole it seems to us that the decision is
beyondquestion correct.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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Supreme Court of Oregon.
COOK v. PRENTICE

FT AL.

An'innkeeper who receives a piano in his character as innkeeper, and as the property of his guest, is entitled to his lien against the piano for board and lodging

furnished his guest, although the piano is in fact the property of a third person.

Win. Hf. Kaiser, for appellant.
Win. N. Ramsay and G. G. Bingham, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LoDI, J.-This suit was instituted by the plaintiff, as an innkeeper, to enforce a lien against a piano, put in his possession by
the defendant, as his guest, for a debt due for lodging and entertainment. By the facts stipulated, it is admitted that the relation
of innkeeper and guest existed between the plaintiff and defendant
when the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, paid the freight
charges on the piano, and took it into his custody ; that the piano
was in fact the property of a third person, who had consigned it to
the defendant to sell on commission ; but that the plaintiff did not
know it was the property'of such third person, but received it in
his character as an innkeeper, and as the property of his guest.
Upon this state of facts we are to inquire whether the piano is
*chargeable with an innkeeper's lien for board and lodging furnished
his guest. At common law the liability of an innkeeper for the loss
of the goods of his guest is special and peculiar, and, like that of
the common carrier, is founded on grounds of public policy. It
must not, however, be confounded with that of a common carrier;
the liabilities, though similar, are distinct: Clark v. Burns, 118
Mass. 275; Schouler, Bailm. 259. Whatever controversy may
exist in the judicial mind as to the true measure of the innkeeper's
responsibility, it cannot be denied that his liability for the loss of
the goods of his guest is extraordinary and exceptional: Schouler,
Bailm. 261, and notes; ogg8 v. Bernard, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. (Am.
notes) 401. Compelled to afford entertainment to whomsoever may
apply and behave with decency, the law, as an indemnity for the
extraordinary liabilities which it imposes, has clothed the innkeeper
with extraordinary privileges. It gives him, as a security for unpaid charges, a lien upon the property of his guest, and upon the
goods put by the guest into his possession: Overt. Liens 129. Nor
is the lien confined to property only owned by the guest, but it will
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attach to the property of third persons, for whom the guest is
bailee, provided only he received the property on the faith of the
innkeeping relation: Schouler, Bailm. 292; aalye's Case, 1 Sm.
Lead. Cas. 249; kanning v. Hollenbeek, 27 Wis. 202. But the
lien will not attach if the innkeeper knew the property taken in
his custody was not owned by his guest, nor had he any right to
deposit it as bailee or otherwise, except, perhaps, some proper charge
incurred against the specific chattel.
In Broadwood v. G-ranara, 10 Exch. 417, the innkeeper knew
that the piano sent to the guest did not belong to him, and did not
receive it as part of the guest's goods, and it was on that ground
alone he was held not entitled to his lien. But in Threfall v.
Borwick, L. R., 7 Q. B. 711, where the innkeeper had received the
piano as part of the goods of his guest, it was held he had a lien
upon it. MELLOR, J., said: "When, having accommodation, he
has received the guest, with his goods, and thereby has become liable for their safe custody, it would be hard if he was not to have a
lien upon them; and, under such circumstances, the lien must be
held to extend to goods which he might possibly have refused to
receive." LusH, J., said: "I am of the same opinion. The innkeeper's lien is not restricted to such things as a travelling guest
brings with him in journeying; the contrary has been laid down
long ago. It extends to all goods the guest brings with him, and
the innkeeper receives as his. If he has this lien as against the
guest, the cases have established, beyond all doubt, that he has
the same right as against the real owner of the article, if it has
been brought to the inn by the guest as owner." To the same effect,
QUAIN, J., said: "There is no authority for the proposition that
the lien of the innkeeper only extends to goods which a traveller
may be ordinarily expected to bring with him. * * * The liability,
as shown by the old cases, extends to all things brought to the inn as
the property of the guest, and so received,-even a chest of charters
or obligations; and why not a piano-forte? If, therefore, the innkeeper be liable for the loss, it seems to follow he must also have
a lien upon them. And if he has a lien upon them as against
the guest, the two cases cited (and there are more) show that
if the thing be brought by the guest as owner, and the landlord
takes it in thinking it is the guest's own, he has the same rights
against the stranger-the real owner-as against the guest." Upon
appeal from tht, decision of this case, in Threfall v. Borwickc
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L. R., 10 Q. B. 210, it was held, affirming the decision, that whether the defendant, as innkeeper, was bound to take in the piano or
not, having done so he had a lien upon it.
Although there are certain dicta, not necessary to the decision,
in Broadwood v. Granara,suTpra, to the effect that the innkeeper
was not bound to receive the piano, yet the real ground of the
decision was based on the fact that the innkeeper knew that the
piano sent to his guest was the property of a third person, and did
not, therefore, receive it as part of his guest's goods, and the right
to subject the piano to his lien was denied; but e converso, if he

had not known the piano was the property of a third person, and
had received it as the property of his guest, would not his lien have
attached? It is not material whether the innkeeper is bound to
receive such property or not, although, it is said, the liability may
be well extended, according to the advanced usages of society; yet
if he does receive it as the property of his guest, and thereby be;.
comes liable for it, he must be entitled to his lien: Trefall v. Borwick, seura. Whenever, by virtue of the relation of innkeeper and
guest, the law imposes this extraordinary responsibility for the goods
of the guest, it gives the innkeeper a corresponding security upon
the goods put by the guest'into his possession.
It is true that the piano was shipped to the defendant in his name,
but he brought it to the inn as his property ; or, at least, it was
brought there at his request, and upon his order, and put in the
custody and possession of the plaintiff as the property of his guest.
It is admitted that the plaintiff received it as an innkeeper, and
safely kept it as the property of his guest; nor is it doubted but
what he would have been liable for its loss; and, in such case, it is
difficult to perceive upon what principle of law or justice he can be
denied his lien.
The judgment must be affirmed.
THAYER, J. (dissenting.)-Upon the main question in the case
there is some doubt, in view of the authorities, upon the subject,
though, upon a common-sense view, there would not seem to be any.
That the man Kane could pledge the appellant's piano for his own
hotel bill, or in any way subject it to the payment thereof, would
shock all sense of property right. The respondent's counsel, however, have cited numerous cases where such a lien has attached to

the property of a third person, and I have no doubt but that such
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lien will, in many cases, attach to the property taken by the guest
to the inn at which he obtains accommodations, though he be not
the owner of it.
But in all such cases, it seems to me, the property must derive
some special benefit, or else the owner must have entrusted it
to a party under circumstances froin which he could reasonably
have concluded that the party would become the guest of an inn,
and take the property with him there as his own; and I do not
think the rule should extend further than this. In the case
under consideration it does not appear that the appellant ever knew
that Kane was stopping at a hotel. He sent the piano to him at
Baker City, to sell upon commission. It does not appear that the
respondent furnished the entertainment upon the credit of the piano,
or upon the supposition that it belonged to Kane. The latter might,
and so far as I can see would, have continued a guest at the hotel
the same whether the piano had been sent or not. It is not a case,
as I view it, where the owner of the property has clothed another
with the indicia of ownership, and a third person been deceived
thereby into purchasing it, or giving credit upon the faith of such
indication. It was purely a business transaction. The appellant
was attempting to make sale of his property, and sent it to Kane
for that purpose. The latter had no authority in the premises except
to exercise the special power conferred, and it does not appear but
that the respondent had full knowledge of the facts as the appellant
alleged he did in his answer. I am inclined to believe that the
burden of proof was upon the respondent to establish that he sup,
posed the piano to belong to Kane, and that he entertained him
upon the faith that such was the fact, before he could claim a lien
upon it for the hotel bill. The property of one man should not be
taken for the debt of another, against the former's consent, unless
he has done some act, or neglected some duty, creating the liability.
A party cannot be deprive& of his ownership to prbperty to satisfy
the claim of another, unless he has, in some form, obligated himself
to submit to it. He must have agreed to it in terms, or done some
act, directly or remotely, authorizing it. I do not think that the
pleadings and agreed facts in this case establish that the respondent
had any lien upon the piano for the hotel bill against Kane, or for
anything beyond the sum advanced by the respondent for the freight
and transportation of it, unless it be for its storage; but the instrument has, doubdess, been used sufficiently to offset any sum for stor-
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age, and the appellant duly tendered the amount advanced as freight
and transportation.

I think the decree should be reversed as to the appellant.
An innkeeper has a lien on the goods
and chattels of the guest, infra hospitium,
for his lodging and refreshment, and for
specific charges against the goods and
chattels themselves : Pollock v. Landis,
36 Ia. 651 ; Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. &
Ald. 283; Domestic Sewing Machine Co.
v. Wetters, 50 Ga. 573 ; and cases
infra.
There are dicta to the effect that the
innkeeper's lien formerly attached to the
person of the guest and to the wearing
apparel and ornaments upon the person:
Dunlap v. Thorne, 1 Rich. (S. C.) 213;
Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 483;
Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. R. 269. But
the doctrine, if it ever had any foundation in authority, is now exploded : Grinnell v. Cook, supra; Sunbolf v. Alford, 3
M. & W. 248 ; a. c. 1 Horn. & Hrl.
13; Wolf v. Smers, 2 Camp. 631.
A boarding.house keeper has no lien
on the boarder's effects unless specially
given by contract or statute : Hursh -v.
Byers, 29 Mo. 469; Ewart v. Stark, 8
Rich. (S. C.) 423; Bayley v. Merrill,
10 Allen 360; Brooks v. Harrison, 41
Conn. 184; Pollock v. Landis, 36 Ia.
651; Sch. Bail. 294.
A contract to pay so much per week
does not make the relation that of boarder
and boarding-house keeper, where the
length of time the guest is to stay is not
an element of the contract : Berkshire
Woollen Co. v. FAoctor, 7 Cash. 417.
"The distinction between a guest and a
boarder seems to be this : I The guest
comes without any bargain for time, remains without one, and may go when he
pleases, paying only for the actual entertainment which he receives; and it is not
enough to make a boarder, and not a
guest, that he has stayed a long time in
the inn in this way.'" Shoecrzft v. Bailey, 25 Ia: 553, citing 1Pars. Cont. 628;
Story Bail. J 477.

The innkeeper's lien will not attach
unless the goods are received by one in
his capacity as innkeeper: Fox v. McGrego-, II Barb. 41 ; Ingallsbeev. Wood,
33 N. Y. 577 ; Binns v. .Pgot, 9 Car. &
P. 208 ; Orchardv. Rackstrew, 9 MI., G.
& S. 698; Miller v. Marston, 35 Me.
153.
In Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
485, it is said: "The inquiry then is
whether the plaintiff received and kept
the horses as an innkeeper. In other
words was he bound to receive and take
care of them, and would he have been
answerable for the loss, if the horses had
been stolen without any negligence on his
part? The lien and the liability must
stand or fall together. Innkeepers cannot
claim the one with any just expectation
of escaping the other.",
In addition to the intimation in the
above opinion, it was said by PARKE,
B., in Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Exch.
417, that the innkeeper's lien would only
cover such goods as the innkeeper was
bound to receive ; but the better opinion
seems to be that it will attach to all
goods and chattels actually received by
one as innkeeper, though hemay not have
been bound to receive them : Berkshire
Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417;
Threfall v. Borwick, L. R., 7 Q. B. 711;
affirmed 10 Id. 210.
The innkeeper's lien extends to the
horses and carriage of the guest, both for
specific charges against the same and for
the guest's personal entertainment : Fox
Y. McGregor, 11 Barb. 41 ; Pollock v.
Landis, 36 Ia. 651 ; Mason v. Thompson,
9 Pick. 280; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26
Vt. 316 ; Calye's Case, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas.
131 ; Story Bail.,
476. And where
horses and carriage are left with one as
innkeeper, the owner becomes a guest
for the purposes of this lien, though he
lodge at another place: Yorke v. Gren-
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a,ll, 2 Ld. Raym. 866; s. c. I Salk.

388; JlcDanielsv. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316.
In PRet v. McGraw, 25 Wend. 653, the
court said, " Besides it is not necessary
in point of fact that the owner or person
putting the horses to be kept at a public
inn should be a guest [ledger?] at the
time, in order to charge the innkeeper or
to entitle him to the right of lien. ** *
If the horses be left with the innkeeper,
though the owner may put up at a different place, the former is answerable for
the safe keeping, and should of course be
entitled to the summary remedy for his
reasonable charges."
It has been lheld that where a guest
brings ahorse and wagon to an inn where
he has been stopping, the lien will attach
for the previous entertainment of the
guest as well as for subsequent expenses
of himself and horse: Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484.
Where an innkeeper is also a liveryman, in which latter capacity he receives
a horse, no lien will arise in his favor
against the horse, because the owner
afterwards becomes a guest at his house:
Smith v. Dearlove, 6 M., G. & S. 132.
The lien of the innkeeper may be extended to cover advances made to the
guest on credit of his effects : lVatson v.
Cross, 2 Duvall (Ky.) 147; Proctor v.
Nicholson, 7 Car. & P. 67.
An innkeeper has a lien on the goods
and chattels of a third person, lawfully
in the possession of his guest and received infra hospitfum, provided he has
no knowledge that the property does not
belong to his guest: Fox v. McGregor,
11 Barb. 41 ; Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27
Wis. 202 ; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485;
Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866 ;
s. c. I Salk. 388 ; Threfall v. Borwick,
L. R., 7 Q. B. 711 ; Turrill v. Crawley,
13 Id. 197.
If the innkeeper knows that the property belongs to a person other than the
guest, he has no lien on it for the guest's
expenses, though he might, perhaps, be
entitled to a lien for specific charges
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against the property itself: Broadwood
v. Granara, 10 Exch. 417 ; Johnson v.
1fill, 3 Starkie 172 ; Domestic Sewing
Machine Co. v. Watters, 50 Ga. 573.
And in Snead v. Watkins, 37 Eng. L. &
Eq. 384 ; s. c. I C. B. (N. S.) 267,
the principle of allowing an innkeeper's
lien against the goods of a third person
in the guest's possession seems to be limited to such articles as a guest might
ordinarily travel with.
Where a father and two daughters
stopped at an inn, it was held that the
innkeeper had a lien on the baggage of
one of the daughters for her own entertainment only, and not for that of the
other two: Clayton v. Butterfield, 10
Rich. (S. C.) 300. As to the liability
of a wife's baggage for her husband's entertainment, see Case v. Fogg, 46 Mlo.
44; Mfulliner v. Elorence, 3 Q. B. D.
484.
If the innkeeper voluntarily allows
the guest to depart with his goods, his
lien is gone, and it will not again attach
for the former debt, upon the owner's
again putting the goods infra hospitium
and becoming a guest: Jones v. Pearle,
1 Strange 556 ; 3 Pars. Cont. 249. But
the departure of a guest for a short
time, anio revertandi, or permitting the
guest to take a horse away simply t"
exercise it, will not release the lien
Allen v. Smith, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 638
Caldwell v. Tutt, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 258
Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485.
The taking of a fraudulent draft in
payment of the guest's bill will not release the innkeeper's lien: ffanning v.
Elollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202. And where a
boarder paid his bill and sold his goods
to another without the boarding-house
keeper's knowledge, the goods were held
liable for the subsequent board of the
boarder with whom they were left, under
a statute giving a lien to boarding-house
keepers: Bayley v. Merrill, 10 Allen
360.
Unless special power of saleL is conferred upon the innkeeper by statute, he
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must enforce his lien by bill in chancery:
Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. 41; 2
Kent Com. 642.
If he sell the property without such
power and without judicial proceedings
(except by custom of London and Exeter), he loses his lien and is liable in
trover for the value of the property :
Case v. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44; Doane v.
Russell, 3 Gray 282: Mulliner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484 ; Jones v. Pearle,
1 Strange 556 ; Chase v. Wetmore, 5

Mane & S. 185; Calye's Case. 1 Sm.
Lead. Cas. 131.
It seems that an innkeeper is not entitled to compensation for storing goods
held by him under lien: Somes v. British Emp. Shipping Co., 8 H. L. Cas. 338.
As to what is sufficient notice of sale to
guest under statutory power of sale, see
Brooks v. Harrison, 41 Conn. 184.
CHARLES A. ROBBINs.

Lincoln, Neb.

United States Circuit Court, T. D., Texas.
WINN v. GILMER.
The citizenship of a party moving from one state into another is controlled by the
intention in that regard with which he takes up his residence in the new place.
A party who has moved from one state into another cannot avail himself of the
jurisdiction of a federal court upon the claim of being a non-resident, after showing
by his acts and declarations, before the litigation commenced, an intention of becom-

ing a citizen in his new place of abode.
SUIT for debt.
Leo. Tarleton, for plaintiff.
Houston Bros., for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
TURNER, J.-" Citizenship," as used in the law under consideration, means residence with intention of remaining permanently at
that place. A man may reside in a state for an indefinite period
of time without becoming a citizen, but the moment a man tikes
up his residence in a state different from that where he formerly was
domiciled or was a citizen, with intent and purpose of making the
new place of residence his future permanent home, that moment he
loses his former domicile, and becomes domiciled in the new place ;
or, in other words, he ceases to be a citizen of the former place of
residence, and becomes a citizen of the state of his adoption.
The question for me to decide is whether Mr. Winn, the plaintiff, and his assignor, from whom- he claims a part of his alleged
right of action at the time this suit was instituted, were citizens of
Texas. I put the question this way, because, if not citizens of
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Texas at that time, it will be conceded that this suit may be properly prosecuted here.
The query raises two questions of fact:
First. Where did these parties reside at the time this suit was
brought ? As a simple question of residence, it may be safely said,
in San Antonio. Both these parties' were single men, leading a
sort of nomadic life, but for the last two or three years the evidence
indicated very clearly that San Antonio was their headquarters, and
the place of residence, for business purposes, or for choice or pleasure, it matters not, for the purpose of this decision.
Second question is, was that residence coupled with an intention
to permanently remain here? From the nature of the case, no
person can judge of the secret intentions dwelling in the minds
of other men. The resolutions, intentions and desires of the mind
are made manifest by acts which often reveal the inward intention
as clearly as it would be if the mind of another was so constructed
that it could be opened and read as we read from a printed volume.
To illustrate: Suppose a man should approach, and deliberately
draw a pistol, and discharge it at the person he was approaching,
and should kill him by so doing, we would all say that the act was
but the execution of a resolution or determination of the mind in
the slayer to do great bodily injury to the person slain, and no
declaration of innocent intention, however strongly asserted, would
convince the observer that the act was other than wilful, and done
in order to carry out a previously formed design. A man throws
into the sea an article of value-we know he intended to part with
its possession forever.
I have given these strong and abstractly convincing acts to illustrate why it is that we may properly judge of men's intentions by
their acts, when not accompanied with declarations; and sometimes
we would conclude that the act spoke louder than the declaration,
if they were inconsistent with each other. Hence arises the familiar
saying that "actions speak louder than words."
The question for me to decide, from all the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence, is whether, after carefully weighing all the evidence, the citizenship of the plaintiff is such as
authorized him to bring this suit in this court. The wisdom displayed in permitting a citizen of another state to sue a defendant
who resides in this state has never been doubted, and that right
should be carefully guarded and protected, whenever the citizen-
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ship is of different states. We know, from observation and experience, that association begets friendship, and friendship begets favoritism and bias in favor of those of whom we think kindly; and a
stranger, who should come into a community, and sue a man of good
standing, and be compelled to take a jury from the friends and
acquaintances of the defendant, would, without any intention on the
part of the jury, certainly have to contend against the bias which
unconsciously, but inevitably, springs from friendly association.
Hence the justice of the law which has created a forum where nonresidents can litigate their legal rights; where juries are obtained
from widely-separated communities, and therefore not likely to be
influenced by any other desire than to administer the law. While
this is true, it is none the less true that the right to be tried by
one's own peers, and to litigate his rights in the courts of his state,
is a right and privilege none the less valuable, and, perhaps, we
may safely say more satisfactory to the defeated party than would
otherwise be the case.
When a young man leaves the parental home, and strikes out
into the world-goes to another state-engages in business for a
considerable length of time,-the natural inference would be that
he intended to build himself up a new home and domicile in the
state where he had taken up his residence. So, likewise, if a man
of years, overtaken by misfortune,-perhaps reduced from luxury
to penury and waat,-with no family ties to bind him, and whose
home of former years has passed from him, and from under his control, in the desperation of his situation abandons the state where
these misfortunes have overtaken him, and remains away for a
term of years,-enters into the business of life with a residence in
a neighboring state,-the inference would naturally arise that he
had no desire or intention of longer remaining in the locality of
all his misfortunes.
Thus much, I think, may safely be said with reference to what
would be the natural inference from facts referred to, and these
facts are made to appear by the plaintiff's evidence. The evidence
of the defendant (which is not disputed) is that the plaintiff, at the
dinner-table of defendant, declared his intention to support Mr.
Cleveland, and the defendant declared his intention to vote for
Mr. Blaine; whereupon plaintiff announced his intention to kill
his vote, which was understood to mean, and according to the common use of that expression did mean, that the plaintiff intended
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to vote for the candidate of his choice. That the conversation was
had, there can be no doubt. This declaration, together with the
further declaration that he expected to remain upon and run the
ranch, certainly justified the defendant in concluding that the plaintiff had become a citizen of the state. Had it been shown that
the plaintiff had exercised the privilege of voting, it would have
been conclusive evidence of his having adopted this state as his
domicile, and he would not be heard to dispute it, as the law
regards that act as conclusive evidence of intention.
It is in evidence, as I have stated, that he said he would vote.
It is in evidence, however, that he did not; and it is in evidence
that he said he could not vote because not a citizen. The assertion that he would vote (for I hold the declaration in evidence is
equivalent to that) is just as persuasive as the declaration that he
would and could not, so far as mere declaration is concerned.
The question then arises, is there any reason why one should
have more influence in determining upon the weight of this evidence than the other? At the time of the declaration that he would
vote, good feeling existed, and no reason can well be assigned for
any motive to make such a statement other than to give utterance
to a formed design; and the same may be said with reference to
the declaration about residing upon and running the ranch in Texas ;
and if, in fact, the design was formed to become a citizen of Texas at
any period during his residence here, he became ipso facto a citizen
of the state of Texas (he being a native of this country), and any
subsequent change of purpose would not restore former citizenship in
another state, so long as he continued to reside here. On the other
hand, it may be fairly inferred from the evidence that the declaration of not voting because not a citizen was made after the possibility of a suit was made evident, and in that case, if it was regarded
as any benefit to sue in this court, then there was a motive in the
latter declaration, where none can be assigned for making the former declaration of intention to vote against the vote (or to kill the
vote) of defendant. This being so, it follows that, in weighing the
evidence, the declaration made when no motive for a misstatement,
is shown, should outweigh the other one, where a reason can be
assigned for making a different statement.
It is but recently that men who are interested in a cause are
permitted to testify in the case. The old rule resulted from a
knowledge of human weakness, where one's own interests are in-
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volved. While a different rule now prevails, human nature has
not changed, and if in weighing evidence, and especially where
there is a conflict, we forget what self-interest has to do with human
action, we come short of duty. I do not wish to be understood by
these remarks as reflecting upon the statement of any witness, because nothing has been said or done that would lead to the conclusion of intentional misstatement, but to show the reasons why one
statement may properly claim preference over another, made under
different circumstances, by the same person, where influenced and
controlled by different motives.
The question, then, arises, shall a person so act and make declarations that justify the belief in the minds of those who deal with
him that a certain fact exists, and when it suits his interest or convenience assert the contrary ? I do not wish to be understood as
asserting in this case that the doctrine of estoppel applies, because
the defendant has done no act prejudicial to his interest, based upon
what plaintiff has.said or done. But I do mean to say that a man
ought not to so act as to justify the belief that a certain condition
of things exists, and then, when it becomes his interest to declare
a different state of facts to exist, and the question presented is rendered extremely doubtful, that he ought not to have the benefit of
that doubt.
The evidence of Mr. Curiton, plaintiffs assignor, is not that he
ever intended to return to Alabama to live. It is true he said he
thought he was a citizen of Alabama, if he was a citizen anywhere.
This was but an opinion, and the evidence fails to satisfy me that
he had not ceased to be a citizen of Alabama.
In conclusion, I may say that acts and declarations of any person, in his own interest, after a controversy has arisen, are received
with disfavor. Yet, under the law, a man may be a witness in his
own case; but with this privilege comes the duty to those who weigh
evidence to discriminate between such evidence as may properly
have weight and such as, by the rules of law, should not. In this
case, if I have reached a wrong conclusion-which I do not believe-the plaintiff must rest satisfied, because his own conduct and

declarations, tending to show citizenship here before any suit was
anticipated, have misled me, which acts and declarations I feel in
duty bound to hold' binding, although those of later date are different.
Cause dismissed.
The question of a party's citizenship,
in determining

the removability of a

cause, from a state court to a federal
court, is not infrequently (as in te prin-
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cipal caze), an interesting question. The
same general rules of law, as to what
constitutes citizenship in other cases, apply in ascertaining the federal jurisdiction in cases of this nature.
What constitutes Domiile.-To constitute a permanent domicile two elements
are indispensable : 1st, that ofact, and 2d,
that of intent-the fact that a person has
his permanent home and business at a
place with a present intention of remaining : Adams v. Abernathy, 37 Mo. 198 ;
Walkcrv. lValker, 1 Mo. App. 413 ; Exchange Bank v. Cooper, 40 Mo. 169 ;
State v. Dayton, 77 Id. 679 ; State v.
Finn, 4 Mo. App. 356; Story on Conft.
of Laws (8th ed.) pp. 40, 43, and cases
cited in note a, on p. 43, and notes a and
b on p. 44 ; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H.
386; Guier v. O'Daniel, I Am. Lead.
Cas. 877, 907; Wayne v. Greene, 21
Me. 357; Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Id.
430.
In cases involving the question of domicile, the chief question to be considered
is the animus manendi: The Venus, 8
Cranch (U. S.) 279.
A new domicile is not acquired by residence unless it be taken up with an intention of abandoning the former domicile : De Bonneval v. De Bonneval, 1
Curtis 864. No length of residence
without tie intention of remaining constitutes a domicile: In re Thompson, I
Wend. (N. Y.) 45. "The onus of proving the change is on the party alleging
it. The presumption of law being, that
a domicile once acquired, subsists until
a change is proved, and the onus is uot
discharged by merely proving residence
in another place, which is not inconsistent
with an intention to return to the original domicile, for the change must be
demonstrated by thefact and intention :"
De Bonneval v. De Bonneval, supra.
The above language is quoted approvingly in Iaham v. Gibbons, 1 Bradf. 90.
A domicile once acquired continues
until the party has acquired another,
by indicating and carrying into effect the

intention of abandoning the old and taking another as his sole domicile : Somerrille
v. Somerville, 5 Vesey 787 ; Story
on Conf. of Laws (8th ed.) p. 53, and
cases cited in n. 7.
•"The naked residence in itself amounts
to nothing, unaccompanied with evidence
of the animus:" Isham v. Gibboas, 1
Bradf. 89. " There must be both animus
etfactum:" Id. "The change of a domicile must be manifested animo et facto,
by the fact of residence and the intention
to abandon :" De .Benneval v. De Benneval, supra.
The domicile may be in one state or
territory and his actual residence in
another : Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11;
Fitzgeraldv. Arel, 18 N. W. Rep. (Ia.)
713; Bradley v. Frasier, 54 Ia. 289 ;
Exchange Bank v. Cooper, 40 Mo. 169.
This is well illustrated in the opinion in
Sanger v. Seymour, post.
Evidence as to Intent.-The declarations of a party made at the time of his
change of domicile, expressive of his
motive or object, are regarded "as verbal acts, indicating a present purpose
and intention," and are admitted as part
of the res gestce: Greenl. on Ev. (14th
ed.) sect. 108, p. 147. Expressions of
intent to reside permanently in a country are evidence of such intention, and,
in so far, evidence of domicile: Dicey on
Domicile, p. 121, rule 17 and cases.
They may be either direct or indirect.
In Doucet v. Geoghegan, 9 Ch. Div.
441, the testator was a Frenchman, but
bad lived a number of years in England, and during most of that time he
was engaged in business in England.
The action was brought to establish a
French domicile. Witnesses were permitted to testify that the testator had
made various parol declarations that he
intended to return to France when he
made his fortune. See Udny v. Udnly,
L. R., I Sc. App. 441 ; Bell v. Kennedy, Id. 307.
Gorham v. Canton, 5 3e. 266, was an
action for supplies furnished a pauper.
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Declarations made by the pauper while
residing at C. were admitted as unguarded disclosures of his intentions, and
for that reason, forming, in part, the
character of his residence in that town.
"When the nature of a particular fact
is in question, a contemporary declaration by the party who does the act, is
evidence to explain it:" 1 Starkie on
Ev. 48. This language was quoted, with
approval, in Gorham v. Canton, supra.
Baring v. Calais, 11 Me. 463, follows
the ruling of the last case, because such
declarations are to be regarded asfacts,
and part of the res gesto. A like ruling was made in Corneille v. Brighton,
39 Me. 333. Here declarations made
by the pauper when going from a town
where he was at work to a town where
his former settlement had been, as to his
intention, respecting his residence, were
held admissible. See Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Me. 430.
In Liorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. 242,
declarations made by the plaintiff at the
time of his departure from Boston, and
while he was making preparations to go
to Edinburgh, as to his intentions, were
held admissible.
In Brundred v. Del Hoyo, 20 N. J. L.
333, evidence was admitted, as to declarations of intention of defendant, in an
attachment against him, on the ground
of non-residence.
In Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 161, correspondence with members of family was
admitted, as showing intention regarding
residence. See, further, Forbes v. Forbes,
23 L. J. Ch. 724; Craigie v. Lewin, 3
Curt. 435 ; Curling v. Thornton, 2 Add.
19; Ennis v. Snith, 14 How. (U. S.)
400 ; Pennsylvania v. Ravenel, 21 Id.
103.
Sanger v. Seymour, 25 Fed. Rep. 289,
is an interesting case. Here the plaintiff insisted that he was a resident of New
York. The testimony was conflicting.
The facts were, that from 1845 to 1883,
the plaintiff's home was in Brooklyn,
N. Y., with the exception of about five.

years, when he resided at Bay Side, Long
Island. In the spring of 1883, he purchased a farm at Greenwich, Conn., for
a summer home. From 1883, until November 1884, he resided in New York
city, spending Sundays and the summer
with his family at Greenwich. From November 1884, till May 1885, he occupied apartments with his family in New
York city. In May he returned to Greenwich for the summer, expecting to occupy his city apartments in the fall. He
never voted except in New York, and
he claimed that he had always been and
intended to be in the future a citizen of
New York. In April 1885, he brought
suit in a state court in New York against
defendants, citizens of New York, who
removed the case to the United States
court on the ground that plaintiff was a
citizen of Connecticut. The court found
on these facts that the plaintiff was not
a citizen of Connecticut, but of New
York, and the cause was remanded to
the state court.
The court said (p. 290) : "There is no
direct proof that he (plaintiff) went to
Connecticut, animo manendi. He positively denies that he changed his domicile, and asserts that he always intended
to remain a citizen of New York. He
is supported in this declaration by a number of collateral facts and circumstances.
His case is, it would seem, not unlike
that of many of the citizens of the metropolis, who spend the summer months
at their villas along the Connecticut and
Rhode Island coasts. Though they remain away from the city the greater part
of the year, they do not, therefore, lose
their citizenship. It may be conceded
that the question is not free from doubt,
but to doubt in such circumstances is to
remand the case to a tribunal which unquestionably has jurisdiction," citing
Levy v. Laclede Bank, 18 Fed. Rep. 193;
Gribble v..Moneer Press Co., 15 Id. 689;
Wolff v. Archibald, 14 Id. 369.
See the observations of Judge LovE
in Delmer v. Franz 27 Fed. Rep. 890,
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as to the federal jurisdiction where there
is a doubt as to the citizenship of parties.
Chicago 4- Xorthwestern Ry. v. Ohle,
117 U. S. 123, is also an instructive case.
The suit was brought in a state court of
Iowa on the 19th of November 1883, by
Ohie, described in the petition as a citizen of Illinois, against the railroad company, an Illinois corporation, to recover
damages for an injury sustained by him,
while a laborer on a construction train in
Iowa. On the 21st of March 1884, the
company petitioned for a removal of the
suit to the Circuit Court of the United
States, on the ground that Oble was a
citizen of Iowa and the railway company
a citizen of Illinois. The case was docketed in the Circuit Court of the I.nited
States, May 13th 1884, and the next day,
May 14th 1884, Ohie moved to remand,
because both he and the company were
citizens of the same state, to wit, Illinois. On the 22d day of May he was
given leave to file a plea in abatement
or to tl.e jurisdiction, which he did, August 29th 1884, alleging that both he
and the company weore citizens of Illinois. Upon this plea issue was joined
and a trial had with a jury, October 30th
1884. On the trial it appeared that, at
the time of the injury, Ohle was a minor,
having his home with his parents, who
were citizens and residents of Burlington, Iowa. While still a minor he
brought suit, by his next friend, in a
state court of Iowa against the company,
to recover damages for his injury, which
suit was removed by the company to the
Circuit Court of the United States. In
April 1883, before a trial was had, OhIe
went to Janesville, Wisconsin, to attend
school for the purpose of learning telegraphy. In October 1883, he went from
his school to Des Moines, Iowa, to attend a trial of his suit, which trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury.
From there he went to visit his parents
in Burlington, where he remained about
a week. After the disagreement of the
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jury, he discontinued his suit, and about
the 6th of November, went to Chicago,
Illinois, where he remained until about
the 27th of November. While he was
in Chicago at this time, the present suit
was begun, and the simp.le question presented on the trial of the issue made, by
the reply to the plea to the jurisdiction
was, whether he had actually, and in
good faith, given up his citizenship in
Iowa, and acquired a new citizenship
in Illinois before the suit was brought.
He was the only witness sworn.
His evidence, in substance, is, that
when he went to Chicago, he intended to
make that his home. But, in a subsequent part ot his testimony, he admitted
that this was done so as to prevent the
railroad company from removing any
other suit he might bring in Iowa to the
courts of the United States ; yet, according to his testimony, he then, being of
full age, did leave Iowa with the bonafide
intention of abandoning his citizenship in
that state, and gaining another in Illinois. He never went back to Iowa to
reside. He took a room in Chicago and
remained there three weeks. Before this
was done the manager of the school in
Janesville, where he was being taught,
had engaged employment for him in Chicago, which he was to enter upon as soon
as he had finished his education. After
this suit was brought he went from Chicago to the school in Janesville, with the
intention, as he testifies, of returning
when he had finished his education ; his
testimony shows that -he did go back on
the 13th of March 1884, took up the
work for which he had been engaged,
and remained there all the time doing
that work until he was sworn at the issue
on the plea to the jurisdiction in this
case. He was examined fully by counsel
for both parties. Some things which he
testified to had a tendency to prove
that be did not in good faith, go to
Chicago with the intention at that time,
of abandoniughis citizenship in Iowa and
acquiring another in Illinois. Ohle also
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introduced an affidavit made by one of
the railway officials, requiring Ohle to
give security for costs, on the ground that
he was a non-resident of Iowa, in which
affidavit it was alleged that Ohe was a
non-resident.
On this state of facts the Circuit Court
found that Ohle was not a resident of
Iowa, so as to give the federal court

jurisdiction on the ground of diversity
of citizenship, and the case was remanded to the state court. This ruling
was sustained by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice WAITE delivering the opinion.
EUGENE McQuIuw.L.
St. Louis, Mo.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
ELLIOT v. SMALL.
A "reservation" is something newly created or reserved out of the thing granted,
that was not in esse before.
An "exception" is a part of the thing granted, and of something in esse at the
time of the grant.
A warranty deed conveyed a parallelogram of land "containing five acres," but
"reserving from said grant a strip, thirty-thre feet wide on the south side of said
tract, for a public street." Held, that the fee to the strip thirty-three feet wide was
in the grantee ; and that if it was either an exception or reservation it was the latter.
APPEAL

from the District Court of Hennepin county.

Shaw

Cray, for appellant.
C'

Hart " Brewer, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The warranty deed involved in this case granted and
conveyed "all the following described piece or parcel of land, * * *
viz. : Beginning at the northeast corner of section thirty-four * * *
thence westerly on the section line, nine chains and ninety-six links ;
thence southerly five chains and two links; thence easterly nine
chains and ninety six links; thence northerly five chains and two
links, to the place of beginning; * * * reserving from said grant
a strip thirty-three feet in width, on the south side of said 'tract,
for a public street, and a strip thirty-three feet in width, on the east
side, which is now used and occupied as a public road and highway." The parallelogram of land thus described-nine chains and
ninety-six links by five chains and two links-contains five acres,
the quantity specified in the deed. The description is precisely that
which is appropriate to the conveyance of the entire five acre tract;
whereas, if the intention had been to exclude from the grant a strip
thirty-three feet wide off of the south side of the five-acre tract,
BERRY,
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then, inas"-ich as t;,e escription is by distances, or dimensions of
,ength aio width, the more obvious, simple and natural way of exclusion would have been to describe the tract intended to be conveyed as being thirty-three feet narrower than the tract in fact
described ; that is to say, as being four chains and fifty-two links,
instead of five chains two links in width.
It is difficult to see why, when he had adopted the plan of describing the property by its width in chains and links, the grantor
should have specified a width greater than the actual width of the
premises which he intended to convey, or why he should have embraced in the specified width thirty-three feet more than he intended
to convey, simply for the purpose of taking it out again. The
obvious and natural construction is that he meant to convey all that
he described as a five-acre tract-nine chains ninety-six links long,
by five chains two links wide.
This being the apparent intention of the grantor in his descriptioa of the five-acre tract, how is it affected by the so-called " reser-a, i )r. ?" Certainly, that does not operate to except from the tract
hv fi of the thirty-three feet strip on the south side, for this
- i:d )e inconsistent with the intention mentioned (if not repuga c., r.d therefore void), but to reserve an easement of right of
q y ! a public street in and over the strip. As it did not except
i f. , and the strip had never been used as a strip, and no street
1 ,er been laid out or opened upon it at the time of the grant,
I. .. called "reservation"
was not, strictly speaking, an exception
'hing; for an exception is of a part of the thing granted, and
!o nething in esse at the time of the grant. A "reservation" is
' Mcd to be something in esse newly created or reserved out of the
thing granted, that was not in esse before ; as, for instance, an
easement: Hurd v. Curtis, 7 Met. 94; Winthrop v. Fairbanks,41
Je. 312 ; Boone, Real. Prop. § 303. So that although the terms
- exception" and "reservation" are often used indiscriminately, and
he difference between them is in particular cases sometimes obscure
.Lud uncertain (Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. 132, and cases supra;
Jtoberts v. Robertson, 53 Vt. 690), the so-called "reserving" of
the thirty-three-feet strip in this case, "for a public street," would
be a "reservation" proper (if anything), as distinguished from an
"exception," properly so called. And right here, and upon this
point, it is important to observe that the strip is reserved "for a
public street." If the grantor intended to except the fee of the
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strip from the grant, his intention was not expressed. The strip
is "reserved" for a public street, and for nothing else. This does
not require the exclusion of the fee of the strip from the grant, but
only an easement; and upon the principle that a grantor's deed is
to be taken most strongly against himself, no such exclusion of the
fee is to be implied.
Our construction of the deed, then, is that it passed to the grantee
the fee of the whole of the five-acre tract: Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn.
103; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 N. H. 212; Tuttle v. Walker, 46
Me. 286 ; Xuhn v. Farnsworth,69 Id. 404; Hays v. Askew, 5
Jones 63; Cincinnati v. Newell's Heirs, 7 Ohio St. 37. Whether
the reservation was of no effect because it was to a stranger and
not to the grantor, as held according to the old common law (Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73), or whether it is valid in favor of
the public, as appears to be held or intimated in Tuttle v. Walker,
and Cincinnativ. Newell's Heirs, supra, is a question with which
the case at bar would appear to have no particular concern.
Order denying new trial affirmed.
Definition.-In Sheppard's Touchstone
it is said that a "reservation is a clause of
a deed, whereby the feoffor, donor, lessor, grantor, &c., doth reserve some new
thing to himself out of that which lie
granted before."
And afterwards, " this doth differ from
an exception, which is ever of part of
the thing granted, and of a thing in esse
at the time; but this is of a thing newly
created or reserved out of a thing demised, that was not in esse before ; so
that this doth always reserve that which
was before, or abridge the tenure [tenor]
of that which was before." Again, "it
must be of some other thing issuing or
coming out of the thing granted, and not
a part of the thing itself, nor of something issuing out of another thing."
"If one grant land, yielding for rent,
money, corn, a horse, spurs, a rose, or
any such like thing, this is a good rese'vation ; but if the resdrvation be of the
grass oirof the vesture of the land, orof
6 common or other profit to be taken out
of the land, then those reservations are
void :" p. 80. See Coke on Litt. 47 b;

Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage, 3 D. &
R. 414; 2 Barn. & Cress. 197; Bro.
Abr. Reservation, p. 46 ; 19 Vin. Abr.
116, 126; Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 321.
"An exception is something taken out
of that which is before granted, by which
means it does not pass by the grant, but
is severed from the estate granted. A reservation is something issuing out of the
thing granted, and not a part of the
thing granted :" Cunningham v. Knight,
I Barb. 407 ; Gould v. Glass, 19 Id.
192 ; State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 21 ; Ryck.
man v. Gillis, 6 Lansing 81 ; Miller v
Lapham, 44 Vt. 434 ; Parsellv. Stryker,
41 N. Y. 483; Dyerv.Saadford, 9 Met.
395; Kister v. Reeser, 98 Penn. St. I ;
s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 608. "Indeed, the
books treat of an exception upon the
theory that it is a re-grant by the grantee
to the grantor of the estate described in
the exception:" Roberts v. Robertson, 53
Vt. 690 ; s.c. 38 Am. Rep. 710 ; Adams v. Morse, 51 Ate. 497.
Rule of Constructio.-" Itis a rule of
construction, that where there is a grant
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antl an cx, p.ion out of it, the words of
the excepton are to be considered as the
words of 'he grantor, and are to be construed in favor of the grantee :" per
HOIROYD, J., Bldhn v. Denning, 5 B.
& C. 850, see WVoodroff v. Greenwood,
Cro. Eliz. 518 ; Earl of Cardiganv. Arnitage, supra, p. 208 ; Marvin v. Brewster Iron MiningCo., 55 N. Y. 538; s. c.
14 Am. Rep. 322 ; City of Waterloo v.
Udon JM Co., 59 Iowa 437 ; s. c. 13
N. W. Rep. 433; Duryea v. Mayor, 6'c.,
of City of N'ew York, 62 N. Y. 592.
In the absence of express stipulation,
the grantor of a part of a tenement retains no rights of any nature over the
part granted : Suffield v. Brown, 4 DeG.,
J. & S. 194: lVheeldon v. Burrows, 12
Ch. Div. 31 ; Russell v. Watts, 25 Id.
559.
The use of the word "reserve" does
not always give the deed the effect of a
reservation ; nor does the use of the word
"except" turn a reservation into an exception. In speaking of a reservation
Coke.says, "'sometimesit hath the force
of ,aving or excepting, so as sometimes
it serveth to reserve a new thing, viz.,
a rent, and sometimes to except part of
the thing in esse that is granted :" Coke
on Litt. 143 a.
Tius where the defendant pleaded that
the plaintiff was tenant to the defendant
of the close in which, &c., subject to a
reservation to the defendant of all pits in
the close, with liberty to carry away the
produce of the pits, BAYLEY, J., Faid it
was not a reservation, but an exception,
and held the plea bad: Fancy v. Scott,
2 Mlan. & Ryl. 335.
So where Sir Thomas Denby enfeoffed the Earl of Sussex of certain
closes, except and always reserved out of
the said feoffmcnt to the said Sir Thomas
all the coals in all or any of said land,
together with the free liberty to sink and
dig pits, this was held to constitute an
exception: Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage, supra.
So where a clause in a lease purported

to reserve underwood and underground
produce, it was held to enure as an exception, and not as a reservation: Douglas v. Lock, 4 Nev. & Manl.807.
Even though words of reservation be
used they will be construed as an exception, if such was the design of the par
ties: Kister v. Beeser, 98 Penn. St. 1
s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 608.
Thus where a deed in fee of land was
made, the grantor "saving and reserving, nevertheless, for his own use the coal
contained in the said piece or parcel of
land, together with free ingress and
egress by wagon-road to haul the coal
therefrom as wanted," it was held that
the saving clause operated as an exception of the coal. The coal was land
and the reservation of that part of the
land excepted from the grant. It was
a thing corporateexisting when the grant
was made, and differed from something
newly created, as rent or other interest
strictly incorporeal : Whitaker v. Brown,
10 Wright (Pa.) 197 : leflin v. Bingham, 56 Ala. 566 ; s.c. 28 Am. Rep.
776; Hoit v. Stratton .3lills, 54 N. H.
109 ; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 119. See Marvin v. Brewster Mining Co., 55 N. Y.
538 ; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 322 ; Knotts v.
Hydrick, 12 Rich. 314. So where a deed
to a railroad company contained a clause
"reserving to myself the right of passing
and repassing and repairing my aqueduct logs forever, through a culvert six
feet wide, and rising in height to the saperstrncture of the railroad, to be built
and kept in repair by said company,"
it was held to confer on the grantor a
new right not previously vested in him,
operative as a reservation and not as an
exception, and vesting only an estate for
life: Ashcrofi v. Eastern Rd., 126 Mass.
196 ; s.c. 30 Am. Rep. 672.
And where a deed reserved to the
grantor " the right of mining on the
above-granted premises, for the use of
said company [the grantor., an amount
of ore not exceeding 7000 tons annually, at a duty of thirty-seven and one-
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half cents per ton, including all the facilities needful for doing the same," it was
construed as a reservation of new rights
to the grantor, out of the granted premises : or else as the creation of such new
rights by force of words of reservation,
taking effect either by way of estoppel,
or as a grant from the grantee by implication of law from the acceptance of the
deed: Stocklridge Iron Co. v. Hudson
Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290.
So a defeasance may operate as a reservation in favor of the grantor: Jackson
v. McKenny, 3 Wend. 233; s. c. 20
Am. Dec. 690.
A very good illustration of a reservation is reserving the right of light and
air to pass over the land sold so as to
reach land still owned by the grantor:
Gay v. Walker, 36 Me. 54; s. C. 58
Am. Dec. 734.
A deed described a tract of land without any reference to a stream included
within the bounds. It then proceeded as
follows: "And it is to be understood,
and it is the intention of this deed, to
convey to the said A. C., as much of
the privilege of the water as shall, be
sufficient for the use of a fulling mill, or
a bark-mill, whenever there is a sufficiency therefor." This was held to be
a reservation of the surplus water, and
not void, for inconsistency with the granting clause: Sprague v. Snow, 4 Pick. 54.
Where the covenants of warranty in a
deed were followed by the clause "except all the wheat on the ground or land
as above described," the deed was construed as not reservina the wheat to the
grantor but as excepting it from the warranty: Knapp v. Woolverton, 47 Mich.
292; s. c. 11 N. W. Rep. 164.
A deed conveyed "all that piece or
parcel of land described as follows, to
wit, being the northeast quarter of section 32, except forty acres in the southeast corner of said section." It was held.
that the deed did not convey the forty
acres excepted: Babcock v. Lattermer,
30 Minn. 417 ; s. c. 15 N. W. Rep. 689.
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A. claimed an island under a survey
and patent describing it as containing
four acres and twenty perches, strict
measure, and describing it by courses and
distances only. He conveyed the same
quantity by the same description, "excepting and reserving twenty perches at
the upper end of said island." Leases
had been made at different times of a
certain twenty perches. It was held that
these twenty perches were to be considsidered as having been excepted from the
deed : Hartley v. Crawford, 81 Penn. St.
478.
The defendant, by a warranty deed,
conveyed to the plaintiff's grantor a certain piece of land, reserving the right to
enter upon a portion of it "at all times
thereafter, so long as the clay and sand
may last or be used for brick-making
purposes," and to dig and take therefrom
the clay and sand that may be found
thereon fit for brick-making. In digging
and removing clay and sand, within the
boundaries of the portion described, some
of the adjoining land fell into the excavation. It was held, in an action for an
injunction, that the clause was a reservation and not an exception ; that the
defendant was entitled to exercise the
rights reserved anywhere within the
boundaries of the parcel described ; that
the doctrine of lateral support did not
apply ; and that the plaintiff could not
maintain his action: .Ryckman v. Gillis,
57 N. Y. 68.
By deed certain premises were conveyed
to a religious society, and a right to build
a basement story upon the premises, to
be used solely for the purposes of a school,
with a right of passage to and from it,
was reserved. The grantee was to build
a church upon the basement walls; and
a privilege was given to him to purchase
the basement. It was held that the deed
vested the fee in the grantee, with the
reservation of an easement merely: Reformed Ciurch of Gallupville v. Schoolcr'aft, 65 N. Y. 134, reversing same case,
5 Lans. 206.
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by the time specified, because any other
rule would be highly injurious : Peasev.
Gibson, 6 Me. 84; Howard v. Lincoln,
13 Id. 122.
linstarion imposed upon the length of
In Vermont stone was reserved to be
time the giantor shall have to remove it.
T ].us where both the standing and lying removed within a time certain. The
court said: "If the property was retimber was reserved, to be removed
within one year, the right of removal was moved by that tinie, it belonged to the
held to be limited to that time, hut the plaintiffs; but if not removed by that
manufacture of such timber into stave- time their right to it was gone. This
bolts on the premises authorized its re- seems to be the natural and obvious conmoval after that time: Golden v. Glock, struction of the deed: Holton v. Good57 Wis. 118; s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 32. rich, 35 Vt. 19. The same principle has
In such a case "the absolute right of been ruled in New York: Boisaubin v.
property in the trees was not excepted Reed, 2 Keyes 323; s. c. 1 Abb. Ct.
out of the eitate granted, but only a right Dec. 161 ; see also McIntyre v. Barnard,
1 Sandf. Ch. 52; Warren v. Leland, 2
reserved to enter within the time limited,
to cut and remove the same :" Rich v. Barb. 622.
For a continuous reservation, see Clap
Zeilsdorf, 22 Wis. 544 ; Martin v. Gilson, 37 Wis. 360; Strasson v. Mont- v. Draper, 4 Mass. 266 ; Prescott v.
Pulsifer, 10 Gray 49.
gomery, 32 Id. 52.
But there are cases holding a different
A like decision was rendered in Pennzylyania, where the reservation was the view of this question. Thus where the
right to cut "at any and all times, also deed reserved the timber, the grantee
the right of ingress and egress at any and stipulating that the grantor should have
rll times, for the space of twelve years two years to remove it, it was held that
from the date above written, for the pur- it might be removed after that time. It
pose aforesaid :1 altonstall v. Little, 90 was said that there was no expressed in',nn. St. 422 ; s.c. 35 Am. Rep. 683, tention of the parties that a failure to
remove it within two years should work
nmtrirg Bacon'z Air., tit. Grant.
So where the reservation was of all the a forfeiture ; and no such inference could
,tmbersuitable for isfting and sawing of be drawn from the nature of the transevery description, and no limit of time action: Irons v. Webb, 12 Vroom 203;
"wa;imposed, it was held that "the grant 32 Am. Rep. 193.
was in its very nature determinable; the
Roadway.-It is no uncommon thing
right to cut timber was not to continue
for ever at tile pleasure of the grantee for a roadway to be reserved over or
and h6 assignee; and if from the dest rue- along a tract conveyed. Where a resertion of the trees, the subject of it, or the vation of a right of way along the bank
refusal of the party to exercise his right of a river was made, it was held not to
after a reasonable notice to do so, the withhold the freehold of the road-bed
right itself is determined, the privilege from the grantees of the land over which
of entry is gone with it, and the owner the road ran. In such a case the title
of the land may sue for breach of close, vests subject to the easement: Hagan v.
though he may not recover in damages Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9; s. c. 33
the value of trees taken, the property of Am. Dec. 267.
So where a deed conveyed a certain
which is not in him : Boults v.AMitchell,
farm by metes and bounds, "reserving
3 Harris (Pa.) 371.
In an early ease in Maine it was held to the public the use of the road through
that the right of the grantor was limited said farm ; also, reserving to the White
Re.q rvi,,q Timber.-It is no uncommon
b,_r for -iml,cr to be reserved by the
irantor
of a deed. Usually there is a
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Mountain Railroad the roadway for said
road, as laid out by the railroad commissioners ; and also reserving to myself
the damages appraised for said railroad way by the commissioners and selectmen," it was held that the intention
of the grantor was to convey to the
grantee the lands over which the public
highway and railroad had been laid out
and established, subject only to the right
of way of the public in the highway and
in the railroad way as laid out, reserving
to himself the damages: Richardson v.
Palmer, 38 N. H. 212. See Leavitt v.
Towle, 8 Id. 96 ; Winthrop v. Fairbanks,
41 Me. 311 ; Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N.
Y. 601.
In a deed, a reservation of "a road
ten feet wide along the line of Joseph
Burger, to be shut at each end," was
held to carry only a right of way and not
the fee of the strip of the land : Kister
Reeser, 98 Penn. St. 1 ; s. c. 42 Am.
Rep. 608.
So a reservation of the right to open
a highway "the whole length of the east
line; and if a public highway shell be
laid out, all the rights of the grantor in
said reserved highway are to pass to the
grantee," was held to reserve the right
to dedicate a highway, the fee therein to
belong to the grantee: Dunn v. Sandford,
51 Conn. 443
A grant of land was made, "saving
and excepting from the premises hereby
conveyed all and so much and such part
and parts thereof as have been lawfully
taken for a public road." It was held
that the fee in the soil of the road, and
not merely an easement, was reserved
to the grantor: illunn v. Worrall, 53
N. Y. 44 ; s.c. 13 Am. Rep. 470. Sce
Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn. 103; Craig v.
Wells, IIN. Y. 315.
Hlow created.-Ifreservation of inheritance is intended to be made, then the
deed must be as specific in the words of
reservation as if it was intended to convey an estate of inheritance. A reser-

vation to the grantor alone will be the
reservation of a life estate only: Ashcroft v. Eastern Rd., 126 Mass. 196;
s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 672; Stockbridge Iron
Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290.
It cannot be created by parol : Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa 253; Bond v.
Coke, 71 N. C. 97 ; Wilder v. Wheeldon,
56 Vt. 344 ; Strout v. Harper, 72 Me.
270. Where, however, the use of the
usual words of inheritance in a commonlaw deed are dispensed with by a statute,
they need not be used in the reservation:
Karmulter v. Krotz, 18 Iowa 358.
So if the reservation is stch a one as
is appurtenant to the land conveyed, or
to land yet owned by the grantor, words
of inheritance need not be used: Winthrop v. Fairbanks,41 Me. 309 ; Smith
v. Ladd, Id. 314 ; Burr v. Mills, 21
Wend. 290; Borst v. Enpie, I Seld. 33;
Cathcart v. Bowman, 5 Barr (Pa.) 317
See Garrison v. Rudd, 19 Ill. 558.
Since an exception is the creation of
no new right in the grantor, but simply
allows him to have that which he had before-leaving the fee in him as it was
before the deed by him was executedit would seem that no words of inheritance are necessary to create an exception
for a period longer than the lifetime of
the grantor. But this distinction seems
to have been overlooked.
In Horneby v. Clifton, Dyer 264 b, it
is stated that words of inheritance should
.be used in an exception, although the
case before the court was a reservation.
So the same is said in a note to this case,
citi--" an old case.
Sheppard's Touchstone lays down the
same rule, citing the Dyer Case, 100.
So in Massachusetts, in a case of a
reservation, the rule is said to apply to
an exception : Curtisv. Gardner, 13 Met.
457; and afterwards in a case of an exception this statement was adhered to :
Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation v.
Chandler, 9 Allen 159.
The reservation or exception may be
created by a reference to another deed
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containing it: French v. Carhart, 1 N.Y.
96.
Reservation must be to Grantor.-Ithas
been said that a reservation to be good
must be to the grantor; and "it is not
the less made to him if others can derive
advantage from it. It will be considered
as made to him when valuable rights are
secured to him, although it may be perceived that others may also be benefited
by it:" Gay v. Walker, 36 Me. 54 ;
s. c. 58 Am. Dec. 734 : Hill v. Lord,
48 Me. 95 ; Bridgerv. Pierson, 45 N.Y.
601 ; West Point 1ron Co. v. Beglnert,
45 N. Y. 707 ; Borst v. Empie, 1 Seld.
33; Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa 358;
Moore v. Earl of Plymouth, 3 B. & A.
66 ; Hnrnbeak v. Westbrook, 9 Johns.
73; Craig v. WVells, 11 N.Y. 318; Barber v. Barber, 33 Conn. 335.
Even a reservation by one tenant in
common, conveying his interest to himself of a right of way over the land held
in common, is void: Marshall v. Trumbull, 28 Conn. 183 ; s. c. 73 Am. Dec.
667.
But a reservation to him and his cotenant is good: Pettee v. Hawes, 13
Pick. 323. See, generally, Bridger v.
Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601.
"A reservation in a deed will not
give title to a stranger, but it may operate, when so intended by the parties, as
an exception from the thing granted, and
as notice to the grantee of adverse claims
as to the thing excepted or reserved :' "
West Point Iron Co. v. Re.mert, 45 N. Y.
707.

Church, 22 N. Y. 44, 53. Yet in another
case in the same state it is said that" an
exception to be good ' must be a part of
the thing granted and not of some other
thing,'" citing Shep. Touch. 78; Co.
Litt. 47 ; 1 Atkinson on Conveyances
322; and 2 Prest. on Con. 462 ; Mathews v. Mathews, 3 Am. L. Reg. (0. S.)
119.
A. conveyed to B. "the undivided
half of lot 10,' excepting therefrom "so
much of said premises as may have heretofore been conveyed (if any) by the
party of the first part to M." The previous deed from A. to M. was a quitclaim for a parcel of ground included in
lot 10 ; but at the time of its execution,
A. had no title to any part of the lot.
It was held that B. took the undivided
half of lot 10, as if no exception had
been expressed in the deed to him : Blossom v. Ferguson, 13 Wis. 75.

When void.--" But if the reservation
embraces all these things, it is as extensive as the grant, and therefore void :"
Dunhamn v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Penn. St.
36 ; s. c.47 Am. Rep. 696 ; Pynchon v.
Stearns, 11 Met. 312 ; S.c. 45 Am. Dec.
210 ; Hurd v. Hard, 64 Iowa 414 ; s.c.
20 N. W. Rep. 740. And it has been
held that there cannot be reserved in a
grant that which will deprive the grantee
of the enjoyment of the whole thing
granted, and that a clause to that effect
must be rejected as absurd and repugnant to the deed ; Hilton v. Ld. Granville, 5 Q. B. 701. But this case has
been questioned and finally overruled
Out of the thing granted.-So a reser- .Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. Cas. 348;
vation must be out of the thing granted. Duke of B. v. Wakefield, L. R., 4 H.L.
It cannot be out of a thing not granted, 377. See Hext Y. Gill, L. R., 7 Ch.
for there is nothing for it to operate upon : App. 700.
So one cannot sell land in fee and
Hurd v. Curtis, 7 Met. 110; Hathaway
reserve to himself the right to the price
v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 92.
But "a grantor may except lands, to be obtained on his grantee's sale :
either because he does not own and can- Dennison v. Taylor, 15 Abb. N. Cas.
not convey them, or because he does not 439
So an exception may be made to deintend to convey them if he is the owner:" People v. Rector, 4-c., of Trinity pend, either for its existence or continuVOL. XXXIV.--91
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ance, on a condition : Irons v. Webb, 12
Vroom 203; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 193.
Where a warranty deed was conditioned for a reservation of all the grantor's right, title and interest for life, this

Am. Rep. 610 ; Webster v. Webster, 33
N. H. 18; contra, Ward v. Ward, 2
Haywood (N. C.) 28, an exception
held void; also, in In reYoung, 11 R. I.
636.

was held t be a valid reservation : Gravers v. Atwood, 52 Conn. 512; s. c. 52

W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
PARKER v. STATE.
The carrying on of one's ordinary business on Sunday, is an indictable offence at
the common law, and also under the statutes of Tennessee, if conducted so openly as
to attract public observation and tend thereby to the corruption of public morals.
It is no defence against such a prosecution that the accused conscientiously believes
in observing, and actually observes, the " seventh" rather than the " first" day of
the week as the Sabbath.

Circuit Court, Henry county.
Indictment and conviction for violating the "Sunday law" by
carrying on ordinary business as a blacksmith. Exceptions, and
appeal by the respondent.
APPEAL from

Cole, Sweeney & Ward, for plaintiff.
The Attorney-General, for the state.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEADERICK, C. J.-Parker was convicted in the Circuit Court
of Henry county, for following and exercising his avocation of
blacksmith, upon Sunday, in April 1885, and on divers other Sundays before that date, and up to the time of taking this inquisition;
and the indictment avers said work was a disturbance and nuisance
to the good citizens of said county; and it averred that such work
was not necessary, or a matter of charity. Another count charges
that Parker was guilty of a public nuisance by such work on Sunday, to the prejudice of the public morals, contrary to the statute,
&c. The proof upon the trial was, that the defendant was a blacksmith, having a shop near Springville, in said county, and numerous
witnesses testify to having seen him at work at his trade, in his shop,
upon different Sundays, within twelve months before the finding of
the indictment. One witness said he knew defendant worked at his
business every Sunday.
The defendant's counsel insisted that, although it is proved that
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defendant worked at his trade on Sunday, there is no evidence to
show that he disturbed or damaged any person thereby, so as to constitute a nuisance, and unless it does appear by proof that some person or persons were disturbed or annoyed, the offence might be
punishable under section 2289 of the New Code, but is not
indictable. It is held in Gunter v. State, 1 Lea 129, 130, that
hunting or fishing on Sunday may be punished by indictment, and
these offences are declared punishable by the same penalties as those
prescribed in section 2289, New Code. See section 2290. So that
the working at one's trade, under such circumstances, and to such
extent, as to amount to a nuisance, is indictable.
Judge McKIsNvY says, in a case wh6re a defendant had been
indicted and convicted for the utterance of obscene words in public,
and quoting from BI. Com. 42, that the municipal law looks to more
than the protection of the lives, liberty and property of the people.
Regarding Christianity as part of the law of the land, it respects and
protects its institutions, and assumes likewise to regulate the public morals and decency of the community. The same enlightened
author distinguishes between the absolute and relative duties of individuals as members of society. He shows that while human laws
cannot be expected to enforce the former, their proper concern is with
social and relative duties. Hence, however abandoned in principle,
or vicious in practice, a man may be, if he keeps his wickedness to
himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he
is out of the reach of the law; but if he make his vices public, they
then become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious effect to
society, and are punishable by the law: Bell v. State, 1 Swan. 42;
citing 1 BI. Com. 124; 1 Id. 41, 42.
In an indictment for profanity, which is punishable under the
statute by pecuniary penalty like this case, it was held that when
the vicious acts are public they will be dealt with as crimes, because
of their tendency to disturb and annoy others, and bxert a baneful
influence upon the morals and habits of the community. Generally,
any practices tending to disturb the peace and quiet of communities, or corrupt the morals of the people, are indictable as public
offences by common law: State v. Graham, 3 Sneed (Cooper's ed.)
133, and cases there cited. In Gaines v. State, 7 Lea 410, it is
held that profanity, when it becomes a public nuisance, is indictable ; but in that case it was held the case was not made out, but a
single act being proved. In 1 Bish. Crim. Law, sect. 946, it is said
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public profane swearing and blaspheming have been held in this
country, to be indictable at the common law, yet, less, according to
some of the judges, as tending to sap the foundations of Christianity, than as disturbing the peace and corrupting the morals of the
community. In the next section it is said; "But however uncertain may be the precise extent to which the common law protects
Christianity, there is no question that it practically and fully
cherishes the public morals, and it punishes as a crime every act
which it deems sufficiently evil and direct, tending to impair the
public morals; and while a single act of the class forbidden by the
statute may be punished by a specific fine, as prescribed by the statute, yet, if repeated and continued, it becomes punishable by indictment at common law :" Id. 1055. See, also, section 939, 2 Bish.
Crim. Law, where it is said, that the doctrine has been laid down in
Pennsylvania that, though a single act of Sabbath-breaking is punishable by a fine, there may be such a succession of acts of the same
sort as will amount to an indictable offence.
The statute makes it unlawful for any one of the enumerated
classes to follow his ordinary secular vocation on the Sabbath-day,
because it is immoral, and is of pernicious effect; and though it
may be conceded that a -single offence may be liable only to the
penalty prescribed by the statute, yet a succession of such acts becomes a nuisance, and is indictable. Such a succession and repetition of the acts is shown in this case, as one witness says that
defendant did work at his trade, as blacksmith, in his shop near
Springville, every Sunday, and others testify to similar acts on many
Sundays within twelve months before the finding of the indictment;
nor is it necessary to a conviction that the proof should show that
any person was disturbed thereby. It is sufficient that the acts
which the law holds as illegal and forbidden, have been done in
such public manner as to have been open to the observation of the
public. Their tendency is to corrupt public morals, and the example is pernicious, and contrary to law and the well-being and good
order of society.
The defendant offered to prove that he belonged to a "Christian
sect," who kept the seventh instead of the first day of the week,
as Sunday. "A general prohibition against doing worldly business
on the Lord's day, extends to persons who conscientiously observe
the seventh day of the week as the Christian Sabbath :" 1 Bishop's
There was, therefore, no error in
Criminal Law, sect. 267.
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excluding the offered testimony, nor in refusing to charge as
requested.
There is no error in the record for which the judgment should be
reversed, and it will be affirmed.
AT Comrox LAw.-The principle
of the first head note to the principal
case is probably correct, and the open
violation of Sunday was probably an
offence at common law : Comm. v.
Jeandell, 2 Grant's Cas. 506 ; Bishop's
Cr. Law,
499, and cases cited. But

doubt has been cast upon this doctrine:
State v. Brooksbank, 6 Ired. 73; State
v. Williams, 4 Id. 400, and cases cited.
CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

STATUTE

LAws.-Most of the states of the Union
have statute laws forbidding ordinary
employments on Sunday. Though the
constitutionality of such laws has been
questioned frequently, the writer knows
of but one instance where it has been
done successfully. In Ex parteNewman,
9 Cal. 502, it was held by two judges,
Justice F xa
dissenting, that a law
which prevented a Jew, who conscientiously observed the seventh day of the
week, from keeping open his clothing
store on Sunday was unconstitutional, as
being a" discrimination and preference"
against a religious belief, and as hindering the free enjoyment of property rights.
But the authority of this case was overruled in Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678,
and the constitutionality of Sunday laws
has been upheld by a remarkable' unanimity of authorities: Frolickstein v.
.Maqorof Mobile, 40 Ala. 725 ; Shover
v. State, 5 Eng. (Ark.) 259 ; State v.
Anderson, 30.Ark. 131 ; Ex parte Bird,
19 Cal. 130 ; Hall v. State, 3 Kelley
(Ga.) 18; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind.
112; Eitel v. State, 33 Id. 201 ; State
v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663; State v.
Ambs, 20 Mo. 214 ; State v. Fearson, 2
Aid. 310; Bode v. State, 7 Gill (MlI.)
326 ; State v. Williams, 4 Ired. (N. C.)
400; Com. v. Cotton, 8 Gray 488; Megowan v. Com., 2 Met. (Ky.) 3; Neuendorf v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557 ; Peo-

ple v. Hoym, 20 How. Pr. 76; Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548; MeGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. E66 ; Piqua v.
Zimmerlin, 35 Id. 507; Com. v. lolf, 3
S. & R. 48; Specht v. Com., 8 Penn. St.
312; City Council v. Benjamin, 2 Strob.
(S. C.) 508; Gabel v.Houston, 29 Tex.
335; Eisner v. State, 30 Id. 524; Bohl
v. State, 3 Tex. App. 683; Swann v.
Swann. 21 Fed. Rep. 299.
Sunday laws are upheld both as a protection to public morals and as establishing a needed sanitary regulation. In
Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, the argument is well stated: "The duty of
government comprehends the moral as
well as the physical welfare of the state;
and in this instance it is asserted on behalf of this law that the passage of it
is essential to the welfare of the people,
both moral and physical. It is claimed
that from physical causes men require
respite from intellectual and physical
labor, in the proportion of one day's
rest in seven ; and that a law which
enjoins this is not only for the aggregate
good of the society, but for the benefit
of all the members. It is said that the
labor of six days, with this relaxation,
is more productive in the long run than
the uninterrupted labor of the week. It
is said, besides, that this law affords,
indirectly, protection 'against oppression
to employees, women, apprentices and
servants, and that but for the law, men
would keep open stores and shops, because their neighbors did so, and that
by competition a sort of compulsion exists to violate 11the laws of health."
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in MeGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566, upheld Sunday laws as a sanitary regulation purely. In that case, THuRSIAwe,
C. J., said : " The act does not to any
extent rest upon the ground that it is
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immoral or irreligious to labor on the
Sabbath any more than upon any other
day. It simply prescribes a day of rest
from motives of public policy and as a
civil regulation." See also Pennsylvania
cases cited, supra.
On the other hand in Lindenmuller v.
People, 33 Barb. 548, much stress is put
upon the argument that Sunday laws
are a protection to public morals. The
court said: "The belief of no man can
be constrained, and the proper expression of religious belief is guaranteed to
all ; but this right, like every other right,
must be exercised with strict regard to
the equal rights of others; and when religions belief or unbelief leads to acts
which interfere with the religious worship and rights of conscience of those
who represent the religion of the country,
as established not by law, but by the
consent and usage of the community,
and existing before the organization of
the government, their acts may. be restrained by legislation, even if they are
not indictable at common law."
Judge COOLEY seems to regard this
latter ground as the more tenable argument in favor of Sunday laws: Const.
Lim. 477. Though it would seem that
his objection to the argument based upon
the necessity of one day's rest in seven,
as having no proper application to those
who conscientiously observe the seventh
day of the week, is much weakened if we
consider that by uniformity alone in the
day observed can the institution be properly preserved and the rights of employees and others protected : Ex parte
Andrews, supra; Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt219.
It is clear on authority that Sunday
laws, which do not provide that the seventh day of the week may be observed
instead of Sunday by those believing in
the sanctity of the former day, are not,
for such reason, unconstitutional ; and
that a conscientious observance of the
seventh day is no defence to a violation
of such laws : Frolickstein v. Mayor of

Mobile, 40 Ala. 725 ; Ex parteAndrews,
18 Cal. 678 ; ExparteBird,19 Id. 130;
Com. v. Hyneman, 101 Mass. 30 ; Com.
v. Has, 122 Id. 40 ; Com. v. Wolf, 3 S.
& R. 48; Specht v. Com., 8 Penn. St.
312; City Council v. Benjamin, 2 Strcqb.
(S. C.) 508.
Indeed, in Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La.
Ann. 671, it was even held that such an
exception rendered a city ordinance invalid. And again it was declared in
Simon's Ex'rs. v. Gratz, 2 P. & W. 412,
that the conscientious scruples of a Jew
against appearing to prosecute his suit on
Saturday was no cause for a continuance.
We cannot conclude the constitutional
argument better than in the words of
Mr. Bishop: " The institution of the
Sabbath, as a day of rest from worldly
labor, dear to him who reveres it for its
Divine origin, has to the statesman and
jurist a significance of a different kind.
It is the cdrner stone of public morality
and happiness, viewed merely as of civil
regulation. And though the law should
not foster any particular sect of religion
at the expense of the rest, or even at
the expense of him who conscientiously
rejects all current forms, still it should
not cast off a good thing, beneficial to
the entire community, simply because the
majority of the people believe it not only
to be good, but to be sanctioned also by
religion:" 2 Bish. Cr. Law, 951.
VIOLATION OF STATUTES.-I.

Under

the English statute of 29 Car. II., which
is substantially followed in several states
of the Union, "worldly labor, business
or work," on Sunday is illegal only when
within the "ordinary calling" of the person charged with violating the statute
Drury v. Defontaine, I Taunt. 131
Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 84 ; Bloxsome
v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232.
And the sale of a horse on Sunday by
one who does not commonly deal in
horses is not illegal under such a statute:
Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406 ; Amis
v. Kyle, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 31. Neither
is the standing of a stallion by one not
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engaged in that business: Scarfe v.
Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270. Nor the hiring of a farm laborer: Rex v.Whitnash,
7 B. & C. 596.
II. The statutes of many of the states
differ from the English statute in omitting
the limitation "within their ordinary
calling :" and when this limitation is not
expressed it is not to bo implied: Bennett v. Brooks, 9 Allen 118.
The following acts have been held violations of such statutes : The hauling ot
manure (Specht v. Com., 8 Penn. St.
312) ; keeping open store (Cincinnati v.
Rice, 15 Ohio 225) ; the sale of liquors
(State v. Arnbs, 20 Mo. 214) ; loaning
money (Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 51;
Frost v. Rumb, 40 Conn. 111) ; and
see cases of Sunday contracts, infra.
III. The statutes of other states omit
the word " business," and are directed
against "common labor" only, or make
use of terms of similar import. The following acts have been held to be violations of such statutes: selling one quart
of beer: 17ogleson v. State, 9 Ind. 112;
Eitel v. State, 33 Id. 201 (criticizing,
Wetzlerv. State, 18 Id. 416) ; selling one
cigar: Foltz v. State, 33 Id. 215; selling
400 bushels of corn: Sellers v. Dugan, 18
Ohio 489 ; the ordinary employment
of an attorney's clerk: Watts v. Van
Ness, 1 Hill 76 ; and see cases on Sunday contracts, infra. Gaming is not
"common labor:" State v. Conger, 14
Ind. 396.
IV. Under the statutes of other states,
the act complained of must be " to the
disturbance of others," to be illegal:
Clough v. Shepherd, 31 N. H. 490;
Starr & Curt. Rev. Stat. Ill. 824.
For cases under yet other statutes, see
Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. 425 ; King
v. Younger, 5 T. R. 449 ; Corn. v.
Lynch, 8 Gray 384; Com. v. Harrison,
11 Id. 308.
SuNDAY CONTR.ACTS.-The making
of contracts on Sunday was not prohibited at common law: 0'Rourke v.
0'Rourke, 43 Mich. 58; Horacekc v.
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Keebler, 5 Neb. 355; Kepner v. Keefer,
6 Watts 231; Swisher v. Williams,
Wright (0.) 754.
1. Under the statutes of those states
providing that the act complained of
must be "to the disturbance of others,"
and also under statutes forbidding "conmon labor" only, omitting the word
"business" and similar terms, the making of contracts on Sundayis not illegal,
according to the weight of authority,
where the making of such contracts is
not the regular business of the party
charged with violating the law ; Richmond v. Moore, 107 Il. 428 ; Johnson v.
Brown, 13 Kan. 529 ; fforaulc v. Keebler, 5 Nob. 355; Bloom v. Richards, 2
Ohio St. 387.
But see Link v. Clemmens, 7 Blackf. 477. A previous contract for Sunday advertising is void,
under statutes of the latter class ; Smith
v. Wilcox, 25 Barb. 341.
II. Where the statute contains the word
"business," or similar terms, Sunday
contracts are invalid: Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390; Dodson v. Harris, 10
Id. 566; Pattee v. Greeley, 13 Met.
284 ; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
73; Fight v. Geer, 1 Root 474; Towle
v. Larrabee, 13 Shepley (Me.) 464 ;
Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts 231 : Lovejoy
v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379 ; Berrill v.
Smith, 2 Miles (Pa.) 402; O'Donnell v.
Sweeney, 5 Ala. 470; Hill v. Sherwood,
3 Wis. 343; Hill v. A'ilker, 41 Ga.
449 ; Bradley v. Rea, 103 Mass. 188 ;
Tucker v. Mowrey, 12 Mich. 378 ; Allen
v. Deming, 14 N. 1. 133; Fennel v.
Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406; 1 Swift's Syst.
367. But contra, Reynolds v. Stevenson,
4 Ind. 619. A previous contract cannot be rescinded on Sunday: Benedict
v. Bachelder, 25 Mich. 425. An action
of deceit in the sale of a horse on Sunday, contrary to law, can not be maintained: Northrup v. Foot, 14 Wend.
248 ; Robertson v. French, 12 Met. 24.
And the parties to an illegal Sunday
contract will be left in statu quo: llers
v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366 ; Moore v.
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Kendall, I Chand. 33 ; Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78 Penn. St. 473; Blakesley v.
Johnson, 13 Wis. 530. But it has been
held that a subsequent promise to pay for
liquor purchased on Sunday, may be enforced : Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis.
252. Though no presumption will be
entertained in favor of the ratification of
an illegal Sunday contract : Winfield v.
Dodge, 34 Mich. 355.
A Sunday note bearing date of Monday, is not void in the hands of an innocent purchaser : Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich.
287; Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439 ;
Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis. 651. Soithas
been said that a Sunday note for an antecedent debt, is good: Kaufman v. Hamm,
30 Mo. 387. A note made on Sunday,
but delivered on Monday, is valid, and
takes effect from date of delivery :
Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H. 500; Hill v.
Dunham, 7 Gray 543 ; Hilton v. Houghton, 35 Me. 143 ; Dohoney v. Dohoney,
7 Bush 217 ; King v. Fleming, 72 In.
21 ; Banksv. Wertz, 13Ind. 203; Corn.
v. Kendig, 2 Penn. St. 448; Lovejoy v.
Whipple, 18 Vt. 379 ; Adams v. Gay,
19 Id. 358. So of an official bond:
Hill v. Parker,37 Mich. 590; and of
a land-contract: Lamore v. Frisbee, 43
Mich. 186. A note made and delivered
(.n a secular day, to take effect on Sunday, is not void: Stacy v. Kemp, 97
Mass. 166.
Under the English and similar statutes,
Sunday contracts are not void, as "business," unless they be further shown to be
" business" "in the ordinary callings of
the parties thereto :" Sanders v. Johnson, 29 Ga. 526 ; Begbie v. Levi, I C.
&J. 180.
NECESSITY AsD CHARITY.-All of
the statutes, we believe, except from their
operation cases of" necessity and charity." From the nature of the case, no
strict definition of these terms can be
given. "The best we can do is to judge
of cases as they arise, and to treat them
as within the prohibition or the saving
clause of the statute according to the spe-

cific features which each presents :" Com.
v. Johnston, 2 Am. L. Reg. (0. S.) 285,
432, 517.
In McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St.
566, THURMAN, C. J., said: "The necessity spoken of in the statute is not an
absolute, uncontrollable necessity only ;
but may be a necessity created by the exigencies of society or trade." And as
was said by PARsoxs, C. J., in Com.
v. Knox, it is sufficient that there be "a
moral fitness or propriety" in the act: 6
Mass. 76; Bennett v. Brooks, 9 Allen
118.
Yet the above should be considered in
connection with the litniiation laid down
in Corn, v. Johnston, supra: "If we decide that necessity and charity mean convenience * * * we emasculate the statute and sweep away the guard which the
.legislature threw around not only the
morals of society, but the physical health
and well being of both men and beasts."
See also, Com. v. &rnpson, 97 Mass. 407.

CIn considering what is lawful or fit
to be done on the Lord's day ' charity'
must include everything which proceeds
from a sense of moral duty or a feeling
of kindness and humanity and is intended
wholly for the purpose of the relief or
comfort of another and not for one's own
benefit or pleasure. That a visit to a
sick child or other relative upon the
Lord's day is within the exception is well
settled. * * * The same reason extends
to the case of a sick friend :" Doyle v.
L. 4- B. Rd., 118 Mass. 195.
The following acts have been declared
judicially, to come within the meaning
of the various statutes in excepting works
of " necessity and charity ;" work neces-

sary to prevent spoiling of malt for beer
((rocket v. State, 33 Ind. 416) ; gathering and boiling sap where necessary to
save (Morris v. State, 31 Ind. 189 ;
Whitcomb v. Gilman, 35 Vt. 297) ; gathering and marketing melcns to prevent
spoiling (Wilkinson v. State, 59 Ind.
416) ; harvesting "dead ripe" wheat
(Turner v.State, 67 Ind. 595) ; remov-
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ing logs broken from raft to place of
safety (Parmalee v. Wilks, 22 Barb.
539) ; loading a ship in danger (The
Richard Matt, 1 Biss. 440; Smith v.
Schooner .r.C. King, 10 Pitts. L. J.
274) ; attending lock on navigable river
(Murray v. Com., 24 Penn. St. 270) ;
hiring horse to take prisoner to jail
(Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich. 454) ; carrying mails (Com. v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76) ;
repairing dangerous highway (F7 agg v.
Millbury, 4 Gush. 243) ; gathering feed
for hogs (Edgerton v. State, 67 Ind. 588);
making bill of sale where necessary to
save debt (Hooper v. Edwards, 18 Ala.
280) ; visiting or getting medicine for
sick child or friend (hicClary v. Lowell,
44Vt. 116; German v. Lowell, 117 Mass.
65 ;Doyle v. .4- B. Rd., 118 Id. 195);
visiting parents (Logan v. Matthews, 6
Pen . St. 417); servant's driving master's coach to church (Com. v. Nesbit, 34
Penn. St. 398) ; making will (Bennett
v. Brooks, 9 Allen 118) ; bringing of
servant to master's house to prepare meals
(Crosman v. Lynn, 121 Mass. 301);
loading vessel to avoid close of navigation (McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St.
566; but contra, Pate v. Wright, 30 Ind.
476) ; selling one cigar from hotel stand
(Carver v. State, 69 Id. 61) ; sale of liquor by innkeeper to guest (Hall v. State,
4 Bar. (Del.) 132 ; but contra, Omit v.
Com., 21 Penn. St. 426 ; and Com. v.
Barr, 34 Id. 86) ; holding spiritualistic
meeting (Feital v. .l. Rd., 109 Mass.
398) ; taking subscription to church fund
(Allen v. Dufie, 43 Mich. I; Dale v.
Knapp, 24 Alb. L. J. 432; but see
Catlett v. .f. E. Church, 62 Ind. 365) ;
holding meeting of benevolent society
(People v. Y. M., dc., Soc., 65 Barb.
357) ; letting of carriage for act of necessity or charity (M11yers v. State, 1
Conn. 502) ; running street car (A. 4S. Rd. v. Renz, 55 Ga. 126; but contra,
Com. v. Jeanddll 2 Grant's Gas. 506.
The following acts have been declared
not to come within the exception in favor
of works of "necessity and charity:"
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driving omnibus for common hire (Com.
v. Johnston, 2 Am. L. Reg. (0. S.) 285,
432, 517) ; impounding hogs (Frost v.
Hull, 4 N. H. 153) ; keeping open barber shop (State v.Lorry, 7 Bax. (Tenn.)
95; Com. v. Jacobus, I Penn. L. Gaz;
Rep. 491 ; Phillips v. Innes, 4 Clark &
F. 234) ; cleaning gig (Leslie v. Mfackie,
32 Am. Rep. 558) ; cleaning out wheelpit to avoid stoppage on secular day'
(McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467) ;
hoeing crops in need of cultivation (Com
v. osselyn, 97 Mass. 411) ; gathering
seaweed on retired beach, to prevent
washing away (Com. v. Sampson, 97
Mass. 407) ; travelling to serve civil process (Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324) ;
or to conduct legal business (Bosworthv.
Swansey, 10 Met. 363) ; or to supply
fresh meat (Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen
18). And it has been said that the necessity must be real and not fancied: Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28, and cases
cited.
LEGAL PROCEEDIGs.-At common
law, only judicial proceedings appear to
have been forbidden on Sunday, and
purely ministerial acts performed upon
that day were valid : Hammons v. State,
59 Ga. 164; Wddon v. Colquitt, 62 Id.
449; Merritt v. Earle, 31 Barb. 38;
Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27 ; Clough v.
Shepherd, 31 N. H. 498. Service of
civil process on Sunday was void: Sham
v. Dodge, 5 N. H. 462.
A verdict is not invalid because re
turned upon Sunday: Jones v. Johnson,
61 Ind. 257; MeCorkle v. State, 14 Id.
39; Joy v. State, Id. '139; .Rosser v.
JfcColly, 9 Id. 587 ; Cory v. Silcox, 5
Id. 370 ; Huidekoper v. Colton, 3 Watts
56. But this principle has been denied:
Bass v. Irvin, 49 Ga. 436 ; Davis v.
Fish, I Greene (Ia.) 410.
Taking bail on Sunday is within the
exception, "works of necessity and
charity :" Johnston v. People, 31 Ill.
469 ; Weldon v. Colquitt, 62 Ga. 449.
CHAs. A. RoBBINe.
Lincoln, Nob.

XIDD v. SMITH.

U. S. Crcuit Court, B. D. of Pennsflvania.
KIDD v. SMITH.'
A court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain a libel calculated to
injure property.
The recent English authorities which sustain the right of the courts to grant
injunctions against libels, are based upon Acts of Parliament, and not on the general principles of equity jurisprudence.
The existence of malice in publishing the libel, can make no difference in the
jurisdiction of the court.
A bill in equity set forth that plaintiff was engaged'in the business of making and
selling an article under a patent; that defendants, two of whom had been in his
employ, engaged in the manufacture and sale -of a rival article infringing his patent ;
that he thereupon filed a bill against them to restrain the infringement, and that
pending proceedings in that suit, the defendants maliciously published circulars, containing false and defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff, and concerning the
validity of the patent, for the purpose of injuring plaintiff's business. Plaintiff
prayed for an injunction to restrain defendants from publishing the aforesaid libel.
Hdd, that the court had no jurisdiction to grant such relief.

MoTION for preliminary injunction.
The bill set forth that complainants carried on the business of
making a light, known as the Albo-carbon light, under a patent;
that the defendants, two of whom had formerly acted as agents for
said light, were manufacturing a rival light, known as the Crystalcarbon light; that complainants had filed a bill against defendants,
for an injunction, on the ground that the crystal-carbon light was
an infringement of the aforesaid patent; that pending that suit,
defendants maliciously, for the purpose of injuring complainants'
business, published certain circulars containing false and defamatory statements as to complainants' light and the patent under which
it was made, and that complainant's business was being damaged
thereby, to an extent that was irreparable. Complainants asked for
an injunction, restraining defendants from publishing copies of the
circulars or making libellous or slanderous -statements concerning
the business of complainants or concerning the validity of said letters
patent, pending the trial and adjudication of the same.
Walter George Smith, Franeis Bawle and A.

Q. Keasby, for

complainants.
B.. Clinton Rioad8 and

. CarrollBrewster, for respondent.

I See note to Log v. Bean, 23 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 709.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-We are asked to grant an injunction in this case,

BRADLEY,

to restrain the defendants from publishing certain circular-letters,
which are alleged to be libellous and injurious to the patent-rights
and business of the complainants; and from making or uttering
libellous or slanderous statements, written or oral, of or concerning
the business of the complainants, or concerning the validity of
their letters-patent, or of their title thereto, pending the trial and
adjudication of the principal suit which is brought to restrain the
infringement of said patents.
The application seems to be altogether a novel one, and is uiged
principally upon a line of recent English authorities, such as Dixon
v. Holden, L. R., 7 Eq. 488; Thorley Cattle -ood Co. v. Massam,
14 Chan. Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 364, and Herman
Loog v. Bean, 26 Id. 306. An examination of them, and other
cases relied on, convinces us that they depend on certain peculiar
Acts of Parliament of Great Britian, and not on the general principles of equity jurisprudence.
By the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c.
125, par. 79, 81, 82), it was provided that, "in all cases of breach
of contract, or other injury, where the party injured is entitled to
maintain, and has brought an action, he may * * * claim a writ of
injunction against the repetition or continuance of such breach of
contract or other injury," &c. ; and "in such action, judgment may
be given that the writ of injunction do or do not issue, as justice
may require," and further (par. 82), the plaintiff may at any time
after the commencement of his action, apply ex parte for an injunction.
This statute gave to the judges of the common-law courts, the
power to issue injunctions in- the cases specified (i. e., breaches of
contract or other injury), to prevent a repetition or cpntinuance of
the injury for which suit was brought.
By the Judicature Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. ch. 66, par. 17),
it was enacted that the High Court of Justice should have and exercise "the jurisdiction which, at the commencement of this act,
was vested in, or capable of being exercised by all or any one or
more of the judges in (the common-law) courts, respectively, sitting
in court or in chancery, or elsewhere, when acting as judges or a
judge, in pursuance of any statute, law or custom, and all powers
given unto any such court, or to any such judges or judge, by
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any statute, and also all ministerial powers, duties and authorities, incident to any and every part of the jurisdiction so transferred."
As the High Court of Justice, established by the Judicature Act
of 1873, was an amalgamation of all the courts of original jurisdiction of Westminster Hall, including the Court of Chancery,
which became merely one of the divisions of the High Court, it followed that the Court of Chancery became invested with the jurisdiction which was given to the common-law courts, by the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854; and hence became vested with power
to grant injunctions to prevent the continuance or repetition of an
injury, which was actionable in any court, and for which an action
was brought, although the power to grant injunctions in cases of
libel, was resisted in several instances by very high authorities, as
in the case of the -PrudentialIns. Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142,
by Lord Chancellor CAIRNs and Lord Justice JAMES; and in that

of Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch. Div. 89, by Sir

GEORGE JESSEL.

The practice of issuing such injunctions, however, finally prevailed. This statute law of Great Britain is sufficient to account
for the English cases relied on by the complainants, and is undoubtedly the basis on which they really stand.
In the case of Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Mussam, 14 Ch.
Div. 763, a leading case on the subject, MALINS, V. C., says, referring to previous cases : " I think these cases at law establish this
* * * doctrine; that where one man publishes that which is injurious to another, in his trade or business, that publication is actionable, and being actionable, will be stayed by injunction, because it
is a wrong which ought not to be repeated."
This is an evident
reference to the Common Law Procedure Act; and other cases expressly refer to the act.
Thus, in the case of Quartz Bill Consolidated Mining Co. v.
Beall, 20 Ch. Div. 501, as late as 1882, Sir GEORGE JESSEL, says :
"This is an appeal from a decision of Vice Chancellor BACON,
granting an injunction upon interlocutory application, to restrain
the publication of a libel. I have no doubt, whatever, that there
is jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. It is plain that the
jurisdiction conferred in the common-law courts, by the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854, eitended to the granting of such an
injunction. The 79th section is as large in terms as can well be,
and the 32d section allows ex parte injunctions in every case where
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a final injunction could be granted, under the 79th section. Of
course, under the rule of omne majus continet in se minus, if the
court can grant an injunction ex parte, 6 fortiori,it can grant it on
notice. It is, therefore, clear to my mind, that the common-law
courts had this jurisdiction in all common-law actions. That jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court, and that would suffice to
decide this question of jurisdiction.. But, by the Judicature Act
of 1873, sect. 25, sub. sect. 8, a larger jurisdiction to grant injunctions than existed before, is given in every case; and in my opinion,
that enactment extends the general jurisdiction given in commonlaw actions, to all actions whether in equity or at common law.
The result, therefore, is that there is jurisdiction in a proper case,
upon interlocutory application to restrain the further publication of
a libel."
But neither the statute-law of this country nor any well considered judgments of the courts, had introduced this new branch of
equity into our jurisprudence. There may be a case or two looking
that way, but none that we deem of sufficient authority to justify
us in assuming the jurisdiction. The authority of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in the cases of Boston.Dialite Co. v. Florence, 114 Mass. 69, and Witehead v. Kitson, 119 Id. 484, is flatly
against it. So, also, are the New York cases of the NYew York
Juvenile, &c., Society v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188: Brandreth v.
Lance, 8 Paige 24; Munger v. _Dick, 55 How. Prac. 182; also,
the Georgia case of Caswell v. Central Bd. Co., 50 Ga. 70; and
the Missouri case of Life Association of America v. Booger, 8 Mo.
App. 173.
We do not regard the contrary decision in Croft v. Riehardson,59
How. Pr. 856, as of sufficient authority to counteract these cases or to
disturb what we consider to be the well-established law on the subject.
That law clearly is, that the Court of Chancery will .not interfere
by injunction, to restrain the publication of a libel, as was distinctly
laid down by Lord Chancellor CAIRNS, in the case of the Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, where he says, in
reference to an application for an injunction to restrain a libol calculated to injure property: "Not merely is there no authority for
this application, but the books afford repeated instances of the
And then referring to several
refusal to exercise jurisdiction."
authorities, "If this decision has since been overruled, it is only
because of the enlarged jurisdiction conferred upon the English

